Searching for non-aggressive targets

Abstract

Faced with the possibility of losing their position due to domestic opposition, political leaders may sometimes consider initiating a foreign conflict as a means to redirect attention away from domestic issues. In such instances, which states are most likely to become diversionary targets? This study assumes that unpopular leaders prefer small-scale conflicts that can create rally-round-the-flag effects without triggering substantial domestic opposition to the use of military force abroad. Based on this assumption, hypotheses are developed which predict that states under constraint (i.e. states with democratic institutions or showing high trade openness) tend to attract diversionary-motivated actions, while states likely to reciprocate harshly (i.e. states experiencing their own domestic troubles or in relative decline) are less likely to become diversionary targets. Logit analyses of directed dyad-years from 1960 to 2001 and illustrations of marginal effects provide strong support for three of the four hypotheses -namely, that democracies and trading states are more likely, and that declining powers are less likely to be targets of diversionary actions. This study's findings show that not all potential targets are equally attractive for diversionary actions, and that a state's democratization, economic openness, and power growth can worsen, rather than improve, its security.

Economic slowdowns and international conflict

“…Often, military conflict with senior economic partners creates domestic discontent and social unrest for junior partners. This is why easily replaceable leaders appear to be non-aggressive targets that invite diversionary action, but not large-scale conflict (Jung, 2014b).…”

“…Therefore, diversionary incentives should generate small-scale conflicts in terms of intensity and duration (Weisiger, 2013). Because long and bloody wars are not popular, leaders search for non-aggressive targets that are unlikely to lead to serious reprisals (Jung, 2014b). For example, since the first North Korean nuclear crisis, some experts have expressed the view that Pyongyang does not want a large-scale war but repeated crises that provide material benefits through the resulting negotiations with Washington and Seoul, which create a siege mentality among the North Korean elites and public.…”

Diversionary Politics and Territorial Disputes: Evidence from Turkish Airspace Incursions

“…Greece is also democratic and home to a small Turkish-speaking ethnic minority (Ifantis 2018:94-95), additionally making it an attractive target for Turkish diversionary action (Jung 2014b;Haynes 2016).…”

Strategic Interaction of Governments and Terrorist Groups in Times of Economic Hardship

“…Diversionary, or political use of force, theory argues that when governments are challenged by negative domestic economic conditions, political failures, or controversies, they use coercive force abroad in an effort to divert the public's attention away from the domestic struggles and toward international success, particularly in cases which are politically burdensome and where directly addressing the problem takes time (Blechman and Kaplan 1978;Fordham 1998;Jung 2014aJung , 2014bLevy 1989;Meernik 1994;Mitchell and Moore 2002;Ostrom and Job 1986;Smith 1996Smith , 1998Tarar 2006). Political uses of force can also demonstrate competence and capability when the negative domestic conditions suggest otherwise (Downs and Rocke 1994).…”

“…For example, leaders choose rival states as possible targets to maximize the 'rally around the flag' effect (Mitchell and Prins 2004). Jung (2014aJung ( , 2014b contends that challenging fear-producing targets and engaging in actions that minimize the risk of further escalation is preferable for diversion-seeking leaders. Targets with poor human rights practices can also help leaders justify their aggression (Tokdemir and Mark 2018).…”