In this paper we present a model in which individuals act in their own best interest, to explain many behaviors associated with cigarette addiction. There are two key features of the model. First, there is an explicit representation of the withdrawal effects experienced when smokers attempt to quit smoking. Second, there is explicit recognition that the negative effects of smoking generally appear late in an individual's life. Among the things Ž . we use the model to explain are: 1 how individuals can become trapped in their decision Ž . to smoke; 2 the conditions under which cold-turkey quitting and gradual quitting may Ž . occur; and 3 a reason for the existence of quit-smoking treatments. q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.JEL classification: I10; D11; D91

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A steady increase in oil imports leaves oil importing countries increasingly vulnerable to future oil price shocks. Using a variation of the U.S. ElA's oil market simulation model, equilibria displaying multiple price shocks is derived endogenously as a result of optimizing behavior on the part of OPEC. Here we investigate the effects that an oil import tariff and a petroleum stock release policy may have on an OPEC optimal price path. It is shown that while both policies can reduce the magnitude of future price shocks neither may be politically or technically feasible.

Some empirically minded philosophers of science argue that the evidence should choose the best theory from among theoretical rivals. H owever, the evidence may not speak clearly, a problem of 'underdetermination of theory by data'. We examine this problem in a concrete setting, rival theories of smoking behaviour. We investigate whether several uncontested pieces of empirical evidence allow us to choose between two competing theoretical perspectives on smoking, rational choice and non-rational choice, respectively. N ext, we develop a more re ned taxonom y of smoking theories, and consider the consequences for theory testing. F inally, we examine some normative aspects of theory choice involving the appropriate scope of government action.

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