No abstract

The opportunities for utilizing swine biomedical models are immense, particularly in models that address lifestyle issues (nutrition, stress, alcohol, drugs of abuse, etc.). However, in order to fully capitalize upon the promise, there needs to be a more general recognition of these cofactors, such as nutrition, as key modulators of phenotype via genomic, epigenetic, and postgenomic mechanisms. Furthermore, increased interactions between nutrition scientists and clinical and fundamental researchers in other disciplines, including developmental biology, immunology, neuroscience, oncology, and cardiovascular and gastrointestinal physiology, are required. Closing discussions focused on the need for future conferences at more frequent intervals to support interactions between the various disciplines. This was especially critical because of the global distribution of investigators.

Neural substrates underlying the human-pet relationship are largely unknown. We examined fMRI brain activation patterns as mothers viewed images of their own child and dog and an unfamiliar child and dog. There was a common network of brain regions involved in emotion, reward, affiliation, visual processing and social cognition when mothers viewed images of both their child and dog. Viewing images of their child resulted in brain activity in the midbrain (ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra involved in reward/affiliation), while a more posterior cortical brain activation pattern involving fusiform gyrus (visual processing of faces and social cognition) characterized a mother's response to her dog. Mothers also rated images of their child and dog as eliciting similar levels of excitement (arousal) and pleasantness (valence), although the difference in the own vs. unfamiliar child comparison was larger than the own vs. unfamiliar dog comparison for arousal. Valence ratings of their dog were also positively correlated with ratings of the attachment to their dog. Although there are similarities in the perceived emotional experience and brain function associated with the mother-child and mother-dog bond, there are also key differences that may reflect variance in the evolutionary course and function of these relationships.

The term animal-assisted therapy (AAT) commonly refers to the presentation of an animal to one or more persons for the purpose of providing a beneficial impact on human health or well-being. AAT is an ideal example of "One Health" because of numerous studies and widespread testimonials indicating that many humans feel better in the presence of pets and other domesticated animals, and, conversely, that some of those creatures appear to respond positively to human company for their emotional and perhaps physical betterment. Many AAT studies have claimed a wide range of human health benefits, but much of the research is characterized by small-scale interventions among disparate fields, resulting in criticisms about weak study design or inconsistent methodology. Such criticisms contrast with the strongly held belief among many that interaction with friendly animals has a strong and innate value for the persons involved. Consequently the appeal of AAT in human medicine today may be generally characterized as a "push" by enthusiastic advocates rather than a "pull" by prescribing physicians. To fully integrate AAT into conventional medical practice as an accepted therapeutic modality, more convincing intervention studies are necessary to confirm its clinical merits, along with an understanding of the underlying mechanism of the human response to the company of friendly animals.

The focus of this paper is the requirement that the use of live animals in experiments and in vivo assays should never be allowed if those uses involve severe suffering. This requirement was first implemented in Danish legislation, was later adopted by the European Union, and has had limited uptake in North America. Animal suffering can arise from exposure to a wide range of different external and internal events that threaten biological or social functions, while the severity of suffering may be influenced by the animals’ perceptions of their own situation and the degree of control they are able to exert. Severe suffering is more than an incremental increase in negative state(s) but involves a qualitative shift whereby the normal mechanisms to contain or keep negative states at arm’s length no longer function. The result of severe suffering will be a loss of the ability of cope. The idea of putting a cap on severe suffering may be justified from multiple ethical perspectives. In most, if not all, cases it is possible to avoid imposing severe suffering on animals during experiments without giving up the potential benefits of finding new ways to cure, prevent, or alleviate serious human diseases and generate other important knowledge. From this it follows that there is a strong ethical case to favor a regulatory ban on animal experiments involving severe suffering.