As franchising has increased its visibility and impact on the business landscape, it has attracted the attention of a wide variety of researchers from different academic backgrounds. We draw together much of this research by juxtaposing the two key theories used to explain franchising, resource scarcity and agency theory, with the empirical findings regarding three key franchising constructs—franchise initiation, subsequent propensity to franchise, and franchise performance. We suggest that research emphasis needs to shift toward understanding why firms initiate franchising and how franchising impacts different types of organizational performance. We also find that extant research can benefit from additional theoretical diversity and thus we offer new propositions grounded in three theories not yet widely applied to franchising.

We review and develop a subjectivist theory of entrepreneurship that focuses on individuals, their knowledge, resources and skills, and the processes of discovery and creativity, which constitute the heart of entrepreneurship. First, we establish the fundamental importance of subjectivity in entrepreneurial discovery and creativity. Second, we build on Penrose (1959) to elaborate how entrepreneurs' perceptions and personal knowledge shape a firm's subjective productive opportunity set. Third, we explain that entrepreneurial perceptions and knowledge partly originate from entrepreneurs' experiences in specific business settings such as the firm, the management team, and the industry. Fourth, we highlight the causal connections between subjectivity in entrepreneurship and observed heterogeneity in firm-level economic performance. Lastly, we suggest directions for further advancing a subjectivist resource-based approach to future entrepreneurship research.

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The causes of failure are central to entrepreneurship research. This study extends agency and resource‐based logic to explain how established franchisors affect franchisee failure. Analysis of 88 restaurant chains shows that franchisors reduce franchisee failure through contract design and by building strategic resources. Thus, franchisors' resource management and contractual policies play a key role in franchisees' survival.

Hybrid organizational forms such as franchise systems join two or more independent parties under a contract. The ability of each party to achieve its goals depend upon the relative bargaining power in the relationship established by the contract. Using transaction cost economics and Porter's (1980) characterization of sources of bargaining power, this paper argues that the franchisor can make investments in activities such as tapered integration and buyer selection to increase its bargaining power and decrease conflict and litigation in a franchise system. Specifically, tapered integration (owning some units while franchising others), selecting inexperienced franchisees, and employing a long training program are predicted to increase the franchisor's bargaining power and the franchisee's compliance with franchisor standards. An empirical analysis of litigation in restaurant franchise systems supports the theoretical hypotheses. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Why firms and individuals reveal information is the subject of considerable theoretical research, but little empirical work has been possible due to a lack of suitable data. In this paper we examine why entrepreneurs selling business opportunities (franchisors) reveal information regarding potential profits (termed earnings claims). Empirical analysis shows that: first, contrary to theory, only a small percentage of franchisors claim; and, second, the franchisors that do claim have lower costs or are responding to competition. In particular, the prediction of theoretical models from economics that resource providers will not transact if information is not disclosed is not supported; resource providers can and do make significant investments even when entrepreneurs refuse to disclose information. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Research summary:This article empirically examines the economic value to firms of investing in the training of their employees and firm-level factors that influence how much the firms benefit. Event study methodology is used to obtain a measure of the economic impact of information regarding a firm's human capital management investments and policies. Subsequent regression analyses are then used to test hypotheses regarding possible complementary relationships between firm-level factors and human capital investments. Results provide robust support for the proposition that effective investments in human capital and training matter, and that these human capital investments are more impactful when combined with complementary assets of R&D, physical capital, and advertising investments.Managerial summary: Do firm investments in training and the development of employee human capital matter with regard to financial performance? We find that, yes, these investments do matter. Our results show that managers who view employee human capital as an asset to be invested in and developed can expect to outperform those who view it as a cost to be minimized. In addition, we find that these human capital investments will be of even greater economic value to firms when they have made complementary investments in R&D, physical capital, and advertising. Copyright