The authors conducted an experiment with a group of military officers and replicated it with a group of students at a public university in the United States. The experimental scenario dealt with a decision problem in the area of counterterrorism. The authors found that while more than one-third of students recommended doing nothing, the overwhelming majority of military officers (more than 90 percent) recommended doing something. Also, military officers exhibited less maximizing and more satisfacing decision making than students. The results show that relying on experiments with students “playing” the role of real-world national security policy makers may bias the results. The two groups are, in fact, very different. Based on student samples, it is possible to accept propositions that would not be found with samples of elite decision makers and reject propositions that may be right. However, it is possible that students can be assigned to experiments where they represent the “public” and not elites.

P revious studies of political decision making have used only "static " choice sets, where alternatives are "fixed" and are a priori known to the decision maker. We assess the effect of a dynamic choice set (new alternatives appear during the decision process) on strategy selection and choice in international politics. We suggest that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions in a two-stage process consisting of an initial screening of available alternatives, and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives. To test the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision process we introduce a computer-based "process tracer" in a study of top-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force. The results show that (1) national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and (2) strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic).

The influence of advisers on foreign policy processes and choice and on how decision strategies affect foreign policy outcomes are examined. Using the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making and process-tracing techniques in an experimental setting, the effects of the presence of advisers on strategy selection and choice and the influence of strategy selection on choice in a foreign policy scenario are tested. The findings show that decision makers are highly sensitive to and cognizant of the political ramifications of their decisions. Specifically, political information and advice influenced information processing and foreign policy choices. The findings have significant implications for the study of foreign policy decision making and the understanding of real-world foreign policy decisions.

In the following paper, I analyze the influence of advisers and domestic political factors on President Clinton's decision to use force against Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo in March 1999. I present an analysis and examination of President Clinton's decision-making process, using press reports, personal speeches, etc. In other words, I attempt to trace the process by which Clinton came to the decision to use force in Yugoslavia. Specifically, using the poliheuristic theory, I argue that President Clinton's decision was influenced by noncompensatory domestic political calculations and the strong influence of his Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright. Examining how advisers interact with one another, their status in the advisory group, and the manner in which presidents solicit information from advisers will further our understanding of how, when, and under what conditions national securitylevel decision makers make decisions.

Previous research on the role of ethnic minority interest groups in US foreign policy has resulted in the development of an extensive list of criteria thought to condition ethnic minority influence. Existing case studies, in spite of their significant contribution, leave open the question of which factors, if any, actually drive influence. The result is a foreign policy decision-making puzzle. We know that ethnic minority groups attempt to influence foreign policy. We also know that foreign policy decision makers sometimes choose the option favored by certain ethnic minority groups. What practitioners and scholars alike do not know is whether decision makers make choices because of the efforts of ethnic minority groups. The experimental designs presented in this study offer the opportunity to solve the puzzle by isolating the impact of diasporic interests on foreign policy decision making at the congressional level. Using a hypothetical foreign policy scenario, the study examines the independent and interactive effects of diasporic numerical significance, diasporic mobilization, and cultural similarity on foreign policy decision making. Results indicate that decision makers are highly responsive to diasporic mobilization, but were unresponsive to diasporic numerical significance and cultural similarity. The overall implication is that small, but highly mobilized, ethnic minority interest groups may be able to significantly influence the development of US foreign policy at the congressional level.In 1959, Lawrence H. Fuchs noted, ''Despite general awareness of the mutual impact of foreign affairs and the claims of minority groups, there has been surprisingly little systematic examination of the results of this process'' (161). Several scholars have since responded to Fuch's call for the advancement of knowledge concerning the impact of ethnic minority interest groups on US foreign policy outcomes. However, there remains a great deal of debate concerning the scope and nature of diasporic influence on US foreign policy. Proponents of ethnic minority influence argue that diasporic communities in the United States are Authors' notes: We would like to thank Pat James, the editors of ISQ, and the three anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments and suggestions.