The “modernization” reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio‐institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.

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Abstract. Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.

Administrative leadership in UK central government has been reformed through the creation of boards in all departments and agencies. This `boardization' is modelled on principles of private sector corporate governance and is a civil service designed response to the administrative implications of depoliticization. It raises issues of political accountability and adaptation of private sector models to the public sector and therefore poses a challenge to the UK Whitehall model. Boardization has been variously implemented across accounting units of central government involving the negotiation of a variety of public sector bargains. It highlights a de-synchronization of administrative and political reforms but provides a potential for boards to become alternative locations for governance and accountability. The article registers concerns about the suitability of reform based on private sector corporate governance and identifies new research agendas.

The article seeks to link the experience of European economic regulation and the diverse forms of capitalism which co-exist within the European Union (EU). Regulation is seen both as a form of public policy and as a means of constituting markets. It is suggested that European regulation affects the evolution (or choice) of a model of capitalism and, on the other hand, that some forms of capitalism are more responsive to government regulation. These forms are more likely to foster the key regulatory goals of compliance, legitimacy and trust. In practice it is argued that there is, as yet, no convergence towards a European capitalism but that the neo-American and social democratic variants continue in uneasy rivalry. European regulation has scored significant successes but is suffering from implementation and compliance deficits. It is further argued that the key target of regulation is the business firm and that firms operating under a social democratic mode of capitalism may be more congenial regulatory partners. Regulatory reform should take account of the compliance characteristics of its regulatory targets.

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