The first supranational policy in the European Union: Competition policy

Abstract

Abstract. Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.

European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance

“…in competition policy, state aids, agriculture, commercial policy and the internal market. Here, the Commission has significant space for autonomous action (McGowan and Wilks, 1995;Nugent, 1994Nugent, ,1995.…”

Explaining (Missing) Regulatory Paradigm Shifts: EU Competition Regulation in Times of Economic Crisis

“…The Treaty included rules on cartels and other restrictive business practices as well as the abuse of dominant positions, public undertakings and state aid, which were stipulated in Articles 85 to 94, later to become Articles 101 to 109 in the Treaty of Lisbon. Shortly after its inauguration, the Commission's Directorate General (DG) for Competition was entrusted with far-reaching investigatory and decision-making powers in the enforcement of these rules and, in 1989, these powers were further extended to the field of merger control (McGowan and Wilks 1995;Gerber 1998;Cini and McGowan 2009).…”

The European Commission's Fight against Cartels (1962–2014): A Retrospective and Forensic Analysis

“…DG IV underwent a significant transformation: its stance on cartel policy went from underactive to active, and even proactive. This supra‐national push in competition policy was explained by several factors (McGowan and Wilks, ): a buildup of a considerable competition case law allowing the Commission to feel more confident when it defined and applied competition rules; a better knowledge and experience dealing with competition cases that the DG IV's staff had acquired during the previous stage; and a new neo‐liberal economic and political climate more conducive to the effective functioning of EU competition policy.…”