In the original article, the graphs in Figs. 4a and 4b were inadvertently reversed. This Corrigendum is correcting that error: Fig. 4a will now be the graph for the multiplicative model, and Fig. 4b will now be the graph for the additive model, as identified in the original figure caption and related discussion in the text.

When people are faced with a decision, they tend to choose the option that draws their attention. In recent years, correlations between attention and choice have been documented in a variety of domains. This leads to the question of whether there is a general, stable relationship between attention and choice. Here, we examined choice behavior in tasks with and without risk and social considerations, using food or monetary rewards, within a single experiment. This allowed us to test the consistency of the decisionmaking process across domains. In the aggregate, we identified remarkable consistency in the attentionchoice link. At the individual level, subjects with strong attentional effects in one task were likely to have strong attentional effects in the others. The strength of these effects also correlated with individuals' degree of tunnel vision. Thus, the attention-choice relationship appears to be a stable individual trait that is linked to more general attentional constraints.

It is a widely held belief that people’s choices are less sensitive to changes in value as value increases. For example, the subjective difference between $11 and $12 is believed to be smaller than between $1 and $2. This idea is consistent with applications of the Weber-Fechner Law and divisive normalization to value-based choice and with psychological interpretations of diminishing marginal utility. According to random utility theory in economics, smaller subjective differences predict less accurate choices. Meanwhile, in the context of sequential sampling models in psychology, smaller subjective differences also predict longer response times. Based on these models, we would predict decisions between high-value options to be slower and less accurate. In contrast, some have argued on normative grounds that choices between high-value options should be made with less caution, leading to faster and less accurate choices. Here, we model the dynamics of the choice process across three different choice domains, accounting for both discriminability and response caution. Contrary to predictions, we mostly observe faster and more accurate decisions (i.e., higher drift rates) between high-value options. We also observe that when participants are alerted about incoming high-value decisions, they exert more caution and not less. We rule out several explanations for these results, using tasks with both subjective and objective values. These results cast doubt on the notion that increasing value reduces discriminability.