In ransomware attacks, the actual target is the human, as opposed to the classic attacks that abuse the infected devices (e.g., botnet renting, information stealing). Mobile devices are by no means immune to ransomware attacks. However, there is little research work on this matter and only traditional protections are available. Even state-of-the-art mobile malware detection approaches are ineffective against ransomware apps because of the subtle attack scheme. As a consequence, the ample attack surface formed by the billion mobile devices is left unprotected.\ud First, in this work we summarize the results of our analysis of the existing mobile ransomware families, describing their common characteristics. Second, we present HelDroid, a fast, efficient and fully automated approach that recognizes known and unknown scareware and ransomware samples from goodware. Our approach is based on detecting the “building blocks” that are typically needed to implement a mobile ransomware application. Specifically, HelDroid detects, in a generic way, if an app is attempting to lock or encrypt the device without the user’s consent, and if ransom requests are displayed on the screen. Our technique works without requiring that a sample of a certain family is available beforehand.\ud We implemented HelDroid and tested it on real-world Android ransomware samples. On a large dataset comprising hundreds of thousands of APKs including goodware, malware, scareware, and ransomware, HelDroid exhibited nearly zero false positives and the capability of recognizing unknown ransomware samples
Abstract. Modern botnets rely on domain-generation algorithms (DGAs) to build resilient command-and-control infrastructures. Given the prevalence of this mechanism, recent work has focused on the analysis of DNS traffic to recognize botnets based on their DGAs. While previous work has concentrated on detection, we focus on supporting intelligence operations. We propose Phoenix, a mechanism that, in addition to telling DGA-and non-DGA-generated domains apart using a combination of string and IP-based features, characterizes the DGAs behind them, and, most importantly, finds groups of DGA-generated domains that are representative of the respective botnets. As a result, Phoenix can associate previously unknown DGA-generated domains to these groups, and produce novel knowledge about the evolving behavior of each tracked botnet. We evaluated Phoenix on 1,153,516 domains, including DGA-generated domains from modern, well-known botnets: without supervision, it correctly distinguished DGA-vs. non-DGA-generated domains in 94.8 percent of the cases, characterized families of domains that belonged to distinct DGAs, and helped researchers "on the field" in gathering intelligence on suspicious domains to identify the correct botnet.
With the continuous evolution of the types of attacks against computer networks, traditional intrusion detection systems, based on pattern matching and static signatures, are increasingly limited by their need of an up-to-date and comprehensive knowledge base. Data mining techniques have been successfully applied in host-based intrusion detection. Applying data mining techniques on raw network data, however, is made difficult by the sheer size of the input; this is usually avoided by discarding the network packet contents.In this paper, we introduce a two-tier architecture to overcome this problem: the first tier is an unsupervised clustering algorithm which reduces the network packets payload to a tractable size. The second tier is a traditional anomaly detection algorithm, whose efficiency is improved by the availability of data on the packet payload content.
Malware authors constantly develop new techniques in order to evade analysis systems. Previous works addressed attempts to evade analysis by means of anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization techniques, for example proposing to run samples on bare-metal. However, state-ofthe-art bare-metal tools fail to provide richness and completeness in the results of the analysis. In this context, Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) tools have become popular in the analysis of new malware samples because of the deep control they guarantee over the instrumented binary. As a consequence, malware authors developed new techniques, called antiinstrumentation, aimed at detecting if a sample is being instrumented. We propose a practical approach to make DBI frameworks more stealthy and resilient against anti-instrumentation attacks. We studied the common techniques used by malware to detect the presence of a DBI tool, and we proposed a set of countermeasures to address them. We implemented our approach in Arancino, on top of the Intel Pin framework. Armed with it, we perform the first large-scale measurement of the anti-instrumentation techniques employed by modern malware. Finally, we leveraged our tool to implement a generic unpacker, showing some case studies of the antiinstrumentation techniques used by known packers.
Industrial robots, automated manufacturing, and efficient logistics processes are at the heart of the upcoming fourth industrial revolution. While there are seminal studies on the vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems in the industry, as of today there has been no systematic analysis of the security of industrial robot controllers. We examine the standard architecture of an industrial robot and analyze a concrete deployment from a systems security standpoint. Then, we propose an attacker model and confront it with the minimal set of requirements that industrial robots should honor: precision in sensing the environment, correctness in execution of control logic, and safety for human operators. Following an experimental and practical approach, we then show how our modeled attacker can subvert such requirements through the exploitation of software vulnerabilities, leading to severe consequences that are unique to the robotics domain. \ud We conclude by discussing safety standards and security challenges in industrial robotics
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