2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_4
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Measuring and Defeating Anti-Instrumentation-Equipped Malware

Abstract: Malware authors constantly develop new techniques in order to evade analysis systems. Previous works addressed attempts to evade analysis by means of anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization techniques, for example proposing to run samples on bare-metal. However, state-ofthe-art bare-metal tools fail to provide richness and completeness in the results of the analysis. In this context, Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) tools have become popular in the analysis of new malware samples because of the deep contro… Show more

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Cited by 43 publications
(83 citation statements)
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References 30 publications
(37 reference statements)
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“…(7) else if all the adjacent nodes of block are visited then (8) Pop block from stack_dfs, mark all adjacent nodes as non-visited. 9else (10) Get the adjacent node that is not visited, and push it into stack_dfs. (11) Check and mark the loops in the traversed nodes.…”
Section: Intercepting All Memory Reads and Writesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…(7) else if all the adjacent nodes of block are visited then (8) Pop block from stack_dfs, mark all adjacent nodes as non-visited. 9else (10) Get the adjacent node that is not visited, and push it into stack_dfs. (11) Check and mark the loops in the traversed nodes.…”
Section: Intercepting All Memory Reads and Writesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(8) Insert curr_ins and extra analysis code to buf. (9) curr_ins ⟵ target_ins (10) break (11) else if the transfer target cannot be directly determined then (12) Switch the context, execute instructions of buf and perform analysis. (13) Get the jump target address target_ins.…”
Section: Intercepting Only Memory Writes Except the Stackmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Arancino [71] is capable of detecting when a malware tries to detect the presence of binary instrumentation and applying the needed countermeasure. As research on malware analysis progresses, so does the sophistication of malware authors.…”
Section: :27mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…And, seventh, it is reproducible: we describe it in detail and have released its source code [34]. Moreover, since we released AVCLASS in July 2016, it has became a popular tool, and has been used by multiple research groups [35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46]. Among these works, Lever et al [47], further demonstrated the scalability of AVCLASS by applying it 23.9M samples.…”
Section: Pup and Malware Labelingmentioning
confidence: 99%