La recessione mondiale innescata dalla crisi finanziaria si è ripercossa con straordinaria violenza sull'attività economica dell'Italia. Qual è stato il contributo dei diversi canali mediante i quali la crisi si è trasmessa alla nostra economia? Quali sono stati gli effetti delle reazioni delle politiche economiche? Per dare risposta a questi interrogativi, in questo lavoro viene realizzata un'indagine controfattuale dell'evoluzione dell'economia italiana nell'arco temporale 2008-2010, esplorando scenari coerenti con l'ipotesi di "assenza di crisi". Si valuta che gli eventi seguiti alle turbolenze finanziarie abbiano sottratto 6,5 punti percentuali alla crescita del PIL nel triennio. In particolare, i fattori di crisi avrebbero gravato per quasi 10 punti percentuali, prevalentemente nel 2009; le politiche economiche e gli stabilizzatori automatici ne avrebbero mitigato l'impatto per circa 3,5 punti percentuali. La maggior parte degli effetti della crisi sarebbe attribuibile all'evoluzione del contesto internazionale; un ruolo meno rilevante, sia pure non trascurabile, avrebbero avuto il peggioramento delle condizioni di finanziamento delle imprese e la crisi da sfiducia che si è accompagnata alla recessione.

This paper examines the challenges faced by the European Central Bank since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. From 2008 to 2014, the need to preserve the correct functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and ensure the supply of credit to the private sector stretched the limits of conventional monetary policy. In 2015, the risk of deflation led the ECB to start a large scale asset purchase programme. The analysis is largely based on a review of the many studies that Banca d’Italia staff has produced on the factors that have brought inflation to unprecedented low levels in 2014 and on the effects of the asset purchase programme. Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Herausforderungen, vor denen die Europäische Zentralbank seit dem Ausbruch der globalen Finanzkrise steht. Von 2008 bis 2014 hat die Notwendigkeit, das ordnungsgemäße Funktionieren des geldpolitischen Transmissionsmechanismus zu wahren und die Kreditversorgung des privaten Sektors sicherzustellen, die Grenzen der konventionellen Geldpolitik überschritten. Im Jahr 2015 führte das Deflationsrisiko dazu, dass die EZB ein groß angelegtes Anleihenkaufprogramm aufnahm. Die vorliegende Analyse basiert im Wesentlichen auf einer Überprüfung der zahlreichen Studien, welche die Mitarbeiter der Banca d‘Italia zu den Faktoren erstellt haben. Diese Faktoren haben einerseits die Inflation 2014 auf ein beispiellos niedriges Niveau gebracht und andererseits Auswirkungen auf das Programm zum Ankauf von Vermögenswerten zur Folge gehabt. JEL Classification: E31, E43, E52

This paper examines the history and the determinants of bank profits in Italy from 2005-15. We first identify a number of key stylized facts by comparing the income statement of Italian lenders with that of banks in other European countries. The comparison suggests that the profitability gap of Italian banks is partly related to a business model characterized by a more conservative positioning along the risk-return frontier. We then use the Bank of Italy's Quarterly Model of the Italian Economy to provide quantitative estimates of the impact of four factors (the economic activity growth rate, taxation of bank income, dynamics of operating costs and dividend policy) on profits, regulatory capital and bad debt. Our counterfactual simulations suggest that the weak growth of the Italian economy is responsible for a sizeable share of the profitability gap of Italian banks, being by far the main driver of the increase in bad debts in the last decade; nonetheless, the impact of the other factors on their profitability (and capitalization) is far from negligible.

We probe the scope for reacting to house prices in simple and implementable monetary policy rules, using a New Keynesian model with a housing sector and financial frictions on the household side. We show that the socialwelfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a reaction to house price variations, when the latter are generated by housing demand or financial shocks. The sign and size of the reaction crucially depend on the degree of financial frictions in the economy. When the share of constrained agents is relatively small, the optimal reaction is negative, implying that the central bank must move the policy rate in the opposite direction with respect to house prices. However, when the economy is characterized by a sufficiently high average loan-to-value ratio, then it becomes optimal to counter house price increases by raising the policy rate.JEL codes: E20, E44, E52

Should euro-area economies be modelled in an aggregate (area-wide) fashion or in a disaggregate (multi-country) one? This article tackles that question from both statistical and economic viewpoint. From a statistical viewpoint, aggregation bias criteria are found to signal that the degree of structural heterogeneity among euro-area economies is such that the loss of information entailed by an aggregate modelling approach may be far from trifling. From an economic viewpoint, we investigate the following issue. Are those statistically detectable heterogeneities of any practical relevance when it comes to supporting monetary policy decision-making? To provide an answer to this question, we compute simple optimal monetary policy reaction functions on the basis of either an aggregate model or a disaggregate one, and compare the associated welfare losses. The results suggest that the welfare under-performance of an area-wide-model-based rule is not only nonnegligible, but also robust with respect to a number of sensitivity analyses.