Under which conditions do regional organizations in the Americas impose sanctions on member states that violate democracy? To address this question, the article combines a qualitative comparative analysis applied to 55 presumed threats to democracy brought to the attention of regional organizations (ROs), and a process tracing analysis of two cases of the imposition of sanctions. The analysis reveals that ROs impose sanctions despite lack of support or even obstruction by the US, when the threats are committed against the incumbent in relatively weak member states. The unique case in which an RO suspended a relatively powerful state because of threats by the incumbent required the convergence of interests between ROs’ most powerful member states, and the support of the US. The article demonstrates that under specific conditions, ROs in the Americas can become relatively autonomous enforcers of democracy-protection norms.
La producción de conocimiento antropológico social en Chile postransición: Discontinuidades del pasado y debilidades presentes Resumen Se caracterizan las principales tendencias de la reciente investigación antropológica social chilena (años 2000-2006), situándolas en la trayectoria histórica de la disciplina en el país. A través del análisis de investigaciones publicadas, de sus marcos paradigmáticos, áreas temáti-cas, diseños teórico-metodológicos y de la audiencia a la que se dirigen, se concluye una alta dispersión temática, inconsistencia paradigmática y debilidades en la construcción teórico-metodológica. Se propone, además, la posibilidad de que esto se deba a una discontinuidad entre la fase fundacional de la disciplina y el momento actual, considerando los procesos políticos ocurridos en el país en las últimas décadas.Palabras claves: antropología -Chile -producción de conocimientocienciometría. Abstract This paper considers the main trends in recent Chilean social anthropological production (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006), with reference to the discipline' s history in the country. Analysis of the contents published by Chilean anthropologists during that period allowed for the ability to distinguish and compare their paradigms and audiences, their areas of thematic interest, and their methodological and theoretical frameworks. Results show a large thematic dispersion, major paradigmatic inconsistencies and weaknesses in theoretical and methodological designs, without clear tendencies towards the creation of an applied anthropology or outlining a proximate configuration of otherness. The conclusion explores the possibility that such discontinuities might result from university disruptions during the dictatorship, which cut off the discipline at foundational moments.
Why have Central American states been able to deliver public goods in the energy sector when most experiences of energy regionalism in Latin American have run into deadlock? Through process‐tracing the different factors that transformed the Central American Electric System (SIEPAC) from a policy‐idea into a fully operative supranational market, this article finds that the Interamerican Development Bank was the orchestrator of governments, national utilities, and extra‐regional state and market actors resulting in the production of energy infrastructure and improved energy security for Central American countries. Through three mechanisms—brokering, agenda‐setting, and assistance—the Interamerican Development Bank kept the cooperation agenda ongoing despite coordination problems and member states' divergent preferences. The article concludes that regional development banks are particularly well‐suited orchestrators of highly technical regionalism initiatives, such as energy integration, because they combine the input‐legitimacy of an intergovernmental organization, the know‐how of an epistemic community, and the resources of a bank. More research is needed to compare the role of various regional development banks in regionalism initiatives in the global South.
INCE the 1990s, South American regional organizations have adopted, formalized and reinforced additional provisions to their constitutive treaties, sanctioning members that do not respect democracy. These 'democracy clauses' have played a central role in recent episodes of political unrest, either by being applied formally -as in the suspension of the membership rights of Paraguay by Mercosur and Unasur (June 2012), and Venezuela by Mercosur (August 2017) -or merely by being invoked, as during the impeachment procedures against President Rousseff in Brazil (in May 2016). Far from being an exceptional case, South American organizations are part of a wider trend, along with intergovernmental organizations in the rest of the Americas, Europe and Africa, all adopting formal democracy clauses.This trend presents a puzzle: a priori, states are eager to retain their sovereignty unfettered. However, by adopting clauses of this kind, states subject their sovereignty to monitoring and even possible sanctions. This article addresses this conundrum by explaining why states decide to formalize binding and enforceable democracy clauses?We argue that South American governments formalized democracy clauses as a reaction to concrete domestic threats with a specific goal in mind: to reduce political uncertainty and ensure government survival. Going beyond the existing literature, we also argue that governments have an asymmetric perception of the usefulness and enforceability of democracy clauses, and that those asymmetric perceptions decisively influence decisions to adopt formal clauses. Decision makers support the adoption of democracy clauses taking into consideration the perceived stability of their own government and that of other member states, and the likelihood of future enforcement of the clauses against their own countries. S 2 Governments which perceive themselves as unstable thus support the adoption and formalization of clauses to the extent that the provisions act to shield their own regimes.Moreover, they perceive that other states within the organization can effectively enforce these provisions if the former so demand. Conversely, governments which perceive themselves as stable and/or too big to be sanctioned support the formalization of clauses because they expect to be their future enforcers and not their targets. We argue that such governments understand democracy clauses as tutelage mechanisms 1 for third parties which are perceived as unstable governments. Motivation for tutelage can emerge from various reasons, such as the desire to protect regional stability or to project an image of being a regional leader or to defend ideologically like-minded governments. Despite these various possible motivations, the structural logic of tutelage remains: some governments perceive themselves as enforcers, while others perceive themselves and are perceived by others as requiring protection.The literature on international institutions for human rights and democracy protection has overlooked the importance of tutelage to e...
States have increasingly become linked through regional energy-related institutions, markets, infrastructure, and politics. ASEAN, EU, SADC, ECOWAS, Eurasian Union, NAFTA, and UNASUR, inter alia, have formal agreements and institutions covering energy. Renewable, nuclear, and fossil fuel energy sources, as well as pipelines and electricity grids, are all covered in the variety of regional formal and informal arrangements. In parallel, the scholarly body of literature on comparative regionalism is expanding, but generally without energy as a focus area. In a systematic review of eighty-six international relations and politics journals, this chapter finds fifty-two articles over a seventeen-year period linking regions and energy. While scholars are giving more attention to the empirics of energy regionalism, research now needs to turn to more systematic theory building along with comparisons between regions and across energy sources and infrastructure types. The chapter concludes with recommendations for a research agenda that focuses on three sets of questions about drivers, institutional design, and effects.
Regional organisations (ROs) around the world increasingly use sanctions against member states in situations of democratic crisis. This special issue unpacks the trend of RO sanctions in regions that are both democracy-dense (Europe and the Americas) and autocracy-dense (Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East). We argue that regional sanctions cannot be taken at face value as instruments of democracy promotion. Instead, the politics of regional sanctions unveil controversies over the substance and limits of democracy, as well as over practical processes of regional interference in a sphere that is at the core of ‘domestic affairs’. In this introductory article, we situate the special issue at the crossroads of debates within comparative regionalism, sanctions, and democracy/autocracy promotion, and discuss how the membership premise crucially distinguishes RO measures from foreign policy and United Nations (UN) sanctions.
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