Erving Goffman's highly influential first book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, introduced the concept of impression management. In spite of the fact that the book has been subject to several cogent criticisms, notably by three major theorists in their own right, Gouldner, Garfinkel, and Habermas, its main thesis has shown remarkable resiliency. I try to suggest that this may be because both Goffman and his critics have their points. The critics have identified serious flaws in his theory but his work still seems compelling because he has identified phenomena that they are not able to explain. This paper seeks to resolve this impasse by accepting that Goffman is accurately describing some phenomena but then suggesting that his way of interpreting these phenomena is misleading. It is argued that the reinterpretation has the power to preserve the value of Goffman's original insights and also meet the valid objections that have been raised against his original claims.
This article is concerned with exploring the idea of places as providing persons with nourishment. This version of person-place relations is displayed in a paper by McHugh and, in provocative fashion, in Michel Serres's analysis of the human condition as a parasitic one. Unlike McHugh, Serres combines his analysis of parasites with a concern that principled actors may be insufficiently attached to places. His views are revealed in his interpretations of works by Molière and Plato. By reinterpreting these works, I try to suggest that Serres's well-founded scepticism as to the level of commitment of principled actors to the places that, as he rightly points out, are nourishing them, may not apply to the sub-set of principled actors who deserve to be called particular.
This paper looks at some of the major texts in the history of role theory. The question that is asked is whether any of these works have been able to theorize the self adequately. It is suggested that neither Parsons nor Merton has any place for the self in their respective theories. While Goffman does make a space for the self, it is only a negative space. Even ethnomethodological theory cannot imagine a role player capable of self-expression. It is argued that a solution to the problem of how to conceive of self and role can be developed from some ideas present in the work of the philosopher Lawrence Blum. The concept of self as identity that can be extracted from his work can allow social theory to imagine actors who are simultaneously expressing their selves and fulfilling their roles. Affinities between this idea and some key concepts in theories of both (Alan) Blum and Peter McHugh and Charles Taylor are suggested.
The article attempts to explore fundamental assumptions underlying Goffman’s theory of interaction. Goffman’s work has long been criticized for certain pervasive weaknesses such as the idea of a self as ‘inside’ and therefore inaccessible, an indifference to any distinction between appearance and reality, and a lack of concern for morality. It is argued that combating these and related problems necessitates uncovering the philosophical roots of Goffman’s way of conceptualizing the self. The article identifies these roots in some assumptions that Goffman shares with and may well have adapted from Sartre. Sartre’s theory of the self is outlined and clear affinities between these two authors’ main assumptions are revealed. The import of this linkage is to point to inevitable obstacles standing in the way of developing the self as a truly social being if one begins with the understanding of what a self is common to both Goffman and Sartre. Next the article puts forward, as an alternative, the ideas of Levinas who has produced an almost point by point rebuttal of Sartre’s version of the self. The key point is that, unlike Sartre and Goffman, Levinas locates the self’s being or consciousness as taking a positive rather than negative form. This differing starting point has demonstrable repercussions for the way the self can relate to both material things and other people. In particular, such a self can be available to, rather than (as in Sartre and Goffman) hidden from, others and is therefore susceptible to others’ influence. Instead of being threatened by the other, there is scope for what Levinas calls non-possessiveness towards and hospitality to others. Finally, the article points out how such a conception of self can be utilized to resolve some specific problems with Goffman’s depiction of social interaction such as his amorality, his views on the role of language and his claims to the omnipresence of concealment.
The article addresses the problem of how to theorize generosity. It argues that generosity is a matter of social actors orienting to standards and suggests, drawing on an analysis by Derrida, that while he too sees the necessity of standards, for him this leads to certain dilemmas as to how actors can actually accomplish generosity. How can actors display the fulsomeness generosity requires while still respecting standards or limits? An attempt is made to resolve this problem by proposing, in line with certain work by Blum and McHugh, and by Taylor, a distinction between merely calculating generosity and reflecting on it. Finally, the communal value of the version of generosity that the article develops is alluded to with the help of a Levinas-inspired version of self-other relations.
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