This paper systematically analyzes the causes of the escalation of violence during the initial stages of the Jeju Island Rebellion and the failure of South Korean counterinsurgency operations. It is argued that four interrelated factors provided the conditions for armed insurgency in the small island of Jeju: inter-agency tension between the Korean National Police (KNP) and the Korean Constabulary; the mainlanders' misinterpretation of the insurgency; the effect of systematic police brutality; and the role of youth groups. Consequently, two counterinsurgency lessons will be drawn from this study: that inter-agency cooperation and coordination at the tactical level between security branches and the incorporation of local population at the micro-level is essential in conducting efficient and effective counterinsurgency operations.
Command coordination and tactical effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations: lessons from the South Korean campaignThis article systematically analyzes the causes of combat effectiveness of the South Korean security forces through the course of its various counter-insurgency (COIN) operations from 1948 to 1953. We argue that improvements in two interrelated aspects ultimately resulted in higher level of performance at the operational and tactical level: unified operational command structure and the subsequent improvements in tactical efficiency under the guidance of the US advisory mission. We analyze the key factors that influenced the overall performance of the South Korea's COIN operations by examining four incidents/crises that occurred from 1948 to 1953: the Jeju Island Uprising, Yeo-Soon Rebellion, Chiri Mountain operations (1948)(1949)(1950), and Operation RATKILLER. Through an in-depth case study on how a nascent army improved its capacity in combating homegrown insurgencies, we demonstrate how the actual conduct of operations itself remains just as significant in the assessment of overall COIN outcomes.
This paper analyses the dynamics of violence during civilian displacement operations. Specifically, we argue that the integration of security forcessolid command structure, monitoring of troops, and the quality of personnelinfluences not only the military performance but also the level of civilian costs. That is, a highly integrated army can commit soldiers to displacement operations while minimising violence. When conducted by a partially integrated army, however, displacement operations are at risk of mass killing, pushing soldiers to remove civilians without sophisticated control. Our qualitative analysis of three major counter-guerrilla operations in South Korea provides support for our thesis.
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