The unnecessary uprising: Jeju Island rebellion and South Korean counterinsurgency experience 1947–48

Abstract

This paper systematically analyzes the causes of the escalation of violence during the initial stages of the Jeju Island Rebellion and the failure of South Korean counterinsurgency operations. It is argued that four interrelated factors provided the conditions for armed insurgency in the small island of Jeju: inter-agency tension between the Korean National Police (KNP) and the Korean Constabulary; the mainlanders' misinterpretation of the insurgency; the effect of systematic police brutality; and the role of youth groups. Consequently, two counterinsurgency lessons will be drawn from this study: that inter-agency cooperation and coordination at the tactical level between security branches and the incorporation of local population at the micro-level is essential in conducting efficient and effective counterinsurgency operations.

Tolerance as Implicit Order: Militias and Sexual Violence as Practice in Indonesian Counterinsurgency Operations

“…Much of the literature on sexual violence has been justifiably focused on Eastern Europe and the civil wars in Africa. Yet, Asia has been no stranger to civilian mass killing and sexual violence (Neill 2002;Wieskamp 2015, 98-107;Park 2010;Davies and True 2017) with the region accounting for 12,374 documented cases, or more than half of all events recorded (Bahgat et al 2016, 8-9;Fulu et al 2013, 9). Here, we conduct a structured and focused comparison case study method (George and Bennett 2004, 67) of Indonesia's three peripheral COIN operations with particular focus on the years with high levels of mass civilian killing and the perpetration of sexual violence: East Timor in the 1990s leading up to the referendum; the second and third phases of the Aceh conflict; and stabilization operations over West Papua throughout the 1980s onwards.…”

Command Coordination and Tactical Effectiveness in Counter-insurgency Operations: Lessons from the South Korean Campaign

“…In fact, it was because of these three factors, it appears, that the insurgency lasted as long as it did. 21 Violent repression to suppress the outbreak of the insurgency was the immediate response selected by the central government in April 1948. Making little effort to identify and resolve local grievances that were at the root of the insurgency, the nascent government of Rhee sent reinforcements to the island with orders to put down the rebellion by force.…”

Draining the Sea with Discretion: Force Integration and Civilian Displacement during South Korean Counter-insurgency Operations, 1948-1953

“…The Eleventh (3,045 personnel led by Col. Jin-kyungPark and Lt. Col. Gyeongrok Choi, 15 May-24 July, 1948), the Ninth (2,112, Lt. Col. Yo-chan Song, 15 July-29 December, 1948), and33 Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, 14-5.34 Jeju People's Guerrillas (JPG), 'Combat Report', in Changsong Moon (ed. ), Hallasaneun Algoitda: Mutyeojin 4.3ui Jinsang [Halla Mountain Witnessed: The Hidden Truth of the 4.3 Incident] (Jeju: Dealim, 1995), 16-86.…”