Problem definition: We consider an entrepreneur designing a fixed funding rewards-based crowdfunding campaign for an innovative product. Product quality is known to the entrepreneur but unknown to some backers. We study how the entrepreneur can signal quality to backers via the design of the crowdfunding campaign, including the price of the reward and the funding target. Academic/practical relevance: Crowdfunding is a new and popular way of funding innovative products. Despite numerous advantages, there are challenges to this model, one of the most significant being credibly signaling information about product quality to a pool of small, uninformed investors. We explore how an entrepreneur might accomplish this and overcome a key obstacle to crowdfunding. Methodology: We employ a game theoretic model of signaling between an entrepreneur and campaign backers. Results: We find that the entrepreneur should signal high quality by setting a high target that is distorted above the full information optimal level. While a separating equilibrium always exists, a pooling equilibrium can only occur under very specific circumstances. We show that the high target affects the quality choice of entrepreneurs and may deter unique, high-quality projects. In addition, we discuss how the entrepreneur should modify the signaling strategy when a high target potentially deters backers from pledging because of the cost of participating in a failed campaign. Managerial implications: We show how entrepreneurs can effectively design their crowdfunding campaign to signal high quality, thus providing guidance to creators listing products on crowdfunding websites. We also show information asymmetry and signaling affect product quality decisions by creators, which in turn is of interest to platform designers seeking to solicit high-quality products for their platforms.
In rewards‐based crowdfunding, entrepreneurs solicit donations from a large number of individual contributors. If total donations exceed a prespecified funding target, the entrepreneur distributes nonmonetary rewards to contributors; otherwise, their donations are refunded. We study how to design such campaigns when contributors choose not just whether to contribute, but also when to contribute. We show that strategic contribution behavior—when contributors intentionally delay until campaign success is likely—can arise from the combination of nonrefundable (potentially very small) hassle costs and the risk of campaign failure, and can explain pledging patterns commonly observed in crowdfunding. Furthermore, such delays do not hurt the entrepreneur if contributors are perfectly rational, but they do if contributors are distracted, that is, if they might fail to return to the campaign after an intentional delay. To mitigate this, we find that an entrepreneur can use a simple menu of rewards with a fixed number of units sold at a low price, and an unlimited number sold at a higher price; this segments contributors over time based on the information they observe upon arrival. We show that, despite its simplicity, such a menu performs well compared to a theoretically optimal menu consisting of an infinite number of different rewards and price levels under many conditions.
Problem definition: We analyze a firm that sells repeatedly to a customer population over multiple periods. Although this setting has been studied extensively in the context of dynamic pricing—selling the same product in each period at a varying price—we consider intertemporal content variation, wherein the price is the same in every period, but the firm varies the content available over time. Customers learn their utility on purchasing and decide whether to purchase again in subsequent periods. The firm faces a budget for the total amount of content available during a finite planning horizon, and allocates content to maximize revenue. Academic/practical relevance: A number of new business models, including video streaming services and curated subscription boxes, face the situation we model. Our results show how such firms can use content variation to increase their revenues. Methodology: We employ an analytical model in which customers decide to purchase in multiple successive periods and a firm determines a content allocation policy to maximize revenue. Results: Using a lower bound approximation to the problem for a horizon of general length T, we show that, although the optimal allocation policy is not, in general, constant over time, it is monotone: content value increases over time if customer heterogeneity is low and decreases otherwise. We demonstrate that the optimal policy for this lower bound problem is either optimal or very close to optimal for the general T period problem. Furthermore, for the case of T = 2 periods, we show how two critical factors—the fraction of “new” versus “repeat” customers in the population and the size of the content budget—affect the optimal allocation policy and the importance of varying content value over time. Managerial implications: We show how firms that sell at a fixed price over multiple periods can vary content value over time to increase revenues.
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