Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), presents a challenge to laboratorians and healthcare workers around the world. Handling of biological samples from individuals infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus requires strict biosafety measures. Within the laboratory, non-propagative work with samples containing the virus requires, at minimum, Biosafety Level-2 (BSL-2) techniques and facilities. Therefore, handling of SARS-CoV-2 samples remains a major concern in areas and conditions where biosafety for specimen handling is difficult to maintain, such as in rural laboratories or austere field testing sites. Inactivation through physical or chemical means can reduce the risk of handling live virus and increase testing ability especially in low-resource settings due to easier and faster sample processing. Herein we assess several chemical and physical inactivation techniques employed against SARS-CoV-2 isolates from Cambodia. This data demonstrates that all chemical (AVL, inactivating sample buffer and formaldehyde) and heat-treatment (56 and 98 °C) methods tested completely inactivated viral loads of up to 5 log10.
24Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of 25Coronavirus disease 2019 , presents a challenge to laboratorians and healthcare 26 workers around the world. Handling of biological samples from individuals infected with the 27 SARS-CoV-2 virus requires strict biosafety and biosecurity measures. Within the laboratory, non-28 propagative work with samples containing the virus requires, at minimum, Biosafety Level-2 29 (BSL-2) techniques and facilities. Therefore, handling of SARS-CoV-2 samples remains a major 30 concern in areas and conditions where biosafety and biosecurity for specimen handling is difficult 31 to maintain, such as in rural laboratories or austere field testing sites. Inactivation through physical 32 or chemical means can reduce the risk of handling live virus and increase testing ability worldwide. 33 Herein we assess several chemical and physical inactivation techniques employed against SARS-34 CoV-2 isolates from Cambodian COVID-19 patients. This data demonstrates that all chemical 35 (AVL, inactivating sample buffer and formaldehyde) and heat treatment (56 o C and 98 o C) methods 36 tested completely inactivated viral loads of up to 5 log10. 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
Background: Global influenza virus circulation decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic, possibly due to widespread community mitigation measures. Cambodia eased some COVID-19 mitigation measures in June and July 2020. On 20 August a cluster of respiratory illnesses occurred among residents of a pagoda, including people who tested positive for influenza A but none who were positive for SARS-CoV-2. Methods: A response team was deployed on 25 August 2020. People with influenza-like illness (ILI) were asked questions regarding demographics, illness, personal prevention measures, and residential arrangements. Respiratory swabs were tested for influenza and SARS-Cov-2 by real-time reverse transcription PCR, and viruses were sequenced. Sentinel surveillance data were analyzed to assess recent trends in influenza circulation in the community. Results: Influenza A (H3N2) viruses were identified during sentinel surveillance in Cambodia in July 2020 prior to the reported pagoda outbreak. Among the 362 pagoda residents, 73 (20.2%) ILI cases were identified and 40 were tested, where 33/40 (82.5%) confirmed positive for influenza A (H3N2). All 40 were negative for SARS-CoV-2. Among the 73 residents with ILI, none were vaccinated against influenza, 47 (64%) clustered in 3/8 sleeping quarters, 20 (27%) reported often wearing a mask, 27 (36%) reported often washing hands, and 11 (15%) reported practicing social distancing. All viruses clustered within clade 3c2. A1 close to strains circulating in Australia in 2020. Conclusions: Circulation of influenza viruses began in the community following the relaxation of national COVID-19 mitigation measures, and prior to the outbreak in a pagoda with limited social distancing. Continued surveillance and influenza vaccination are required to limit the impact of influenza globally.
In January 2017, an estimated 3,700 (93%) of 4,000 Khaki Campbell ducks (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus) died in Kampong Thom Province, Cambodia. We detected low pathogenicity avian influenza A(H7N3) virus and anatid herpesvirus 1 (duck plague) in the affected flock; however, the exact cause of the mortality event remains unclear.
In Cambodia, highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) subtype viruses circulate endemically causing poultry outbreaks and zoonotic human cases. To investigate the genomic diversity and development of endemicity of the predominantly circulating clade 2.3.2.1c A(H5N1) viruses, we characterised 68 AIVs detected in poultry, the environment and from a single human A(H5N1) case from January 2014 to December 2016. Full genomes were generated for 42 A(H5N1) viruses. Phylogenetic analysis shows that five clade 2.3.2.1c genotypes, designated KH1 to KH5, were circulating in Cambodia during this period. The genotypes arose through multiple reassortment events with the neuraminidase (NA) and internal genes belonging to H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1a, clade 2.3.2.1b or A(H9N2) lineages. Phylogenies suggest that the Cambodian AIVs were derived from viruses circulating between Cambodian and Vietnamese poultry. Molecular analyses show that these viruses contained the hemagglutinin (HA) gene substitutions D94N, S133A, S155N, T156A, T188I and K189R known to increase binding to the human-type α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors. Two A(H5N1) viruses displayed the M2 gene S31N or A30T substitutions indicative of adamantane resistance, however, susceptibility testing towards neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir, zanamivir, lananmivir and peramivir) of a subset of thirty clade 2.3.2.1c viruses showed susceptibility to all four drugs. This study shows that A(H5N1) viruses continue to reassort with other A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) viruses that are endemic in the region, highlighting the risk of introduction and emergence of novel A(H5N1) genotypes in Cambodia.
Live bird markets (LBMs) have been identified as key factors in the spread, persistence and evolution of avian influenza viruses (AIVs). In addition, these settings have been associated with human infections with AIVs of pandemic concern. Exposure to aerosolised AIVs by workers in a Cambodian LBM was assessed using aerosol impact samplers. LBM vendors were asked to wear an air sampler for 30 min per day for 1 week while continuing their usual activities in the LBM during a period of high AIV circulation (February) and a period of low circulation (May). During the period of high circulation, AIV RNA was detected from 100% of the air samplers using molecular methods and viable AIV (A/H5N1 and/or A/H9N2) was isolated from 50% of air samplers following inoculation into embryonated chicken eggs. In contrast, AIV was not detected by molecular methods or successfully isolated during the period of low circulation. This study demonstrates the increased risk of aerosol exposure of LBM workers to AIVs during periods of high circulation and highlights the need for interventions during these high-risk periods. Novel approaches, such as environmental sampling, should be further explored at key high-risk interfaces as a potentially costeffective alternative for monitoring pandemic threats.
Live bird market surveillance for avian influenza viruses in Cambodia in 2015 has led to the detection of two 7:1 reassortant influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1c viruses. These reassortant strains, designated A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 and A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015, both contained a single gene (PB1 and matrix gene, respectively) from concurrently circulating A(H9N2) influenza viruses. All other viral genes from both isolates clustered with A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 viruses. Continued and prolonged co-circulation of influenza A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) viruses in Cambodian live bird markets may present a risk for the emergence of novel influenza reassortant viruses with negative agricultural and/or public health implications.
S ince 2014, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) with H5 hemagglutinin (HA) genes grouped in the genetic clade 2.3.4.4 have spread globally causing severe outbreaks in Africa, Europe, Asia, and most recently, North America (1). These viruses cause devastating outbreaks in poultry, rapidly evolve, and continuously reassort with other avian influenza viruses (AIVs), posing a threat to food security in many parts of the world and substantial zoonotic infection risk.
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