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Purpose This study aims to examine how the role of peripheral knowledge changes along with the perspectives of vendor and client in inter-organizational IT outsourcing. To this end, this study tests the effects of the peripheral knowledge of vendors and clients on IT outsourcing performance under three different combinations of performance-assessing views from both parties. Design/methodology/approach To contrast the effects of the peripheral knowledge of vendors and clients based on their views, this study collects matching data on 107 projects from both parties. The survey method is adopted to measure the peripheral knowledge levels of vendors and clients and IT outsourcing success. The associations between peripheral knowledge and IT outsourcing performance are then assessed when the views match, cross and agree to a certain level. Findings The peripheral knowledge of vendors plays a more significant role than that of clients in most IT outsourcing cases. Moreover, the agreement between the peripheral knowledge of vendors and clients shows a moderating effect only when the performance is assessed by clients than by vendors. Originality/value This study contrasts the peripheral knowledge of vendors and clients by altering performance-assessing views in IT outsourcing. This study also rationalizes why the peripheral knowledge of vendors is more important than that of clients, as well as explains whose perspective is more significant when the performance is assessed.

This study identifies how relational and contractual governance mechanisms differently influence the distinct output of information systems development (ISD) performance at the project level. This study also reveals how the consequence of two modes of inter-organizational relationships (IOR) governance mechanism is affected by the gap of a dyadic partner’s centrality within the network — the client’s structural power (CSP). We collected dyadic samples of clients and vendors for 107 ISD projects and explored their governance mechanisms and project performances, all of which were evaluated by both parties. Our results first reveal a positive relationship between relational (or contractual) governance and qualitative (or quantitative) performance, respectively, but not vice versa. Second, the results incorporating a structural position within the network reveal that CSP facilitates the efficacy of relational governance to lead the quantitative performance, but surprisingly, CSP also mitigates the efficacy of contractual governance.