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Previous studies have examined the impact of an exogenous increase in population on the local resource base. In some recent theoretical work it has been proposed that resource scarcity, in turn, may affect fertility, and hence population growth rates. However, the sign and magnitude of this effect remains an open empirical question. In this paper we examine the impact of fuelwood and water scarcity on fertility rates using household data from rural South Africa. An individual choice model of fertility is estimated in which resource scarcity affects the demand for children through its effect on child mortality and productivity of children as resource collectors. Several alternative measures of resource scarcity are used, such as average distance traveled and time per trip for collecting water and fuelwood. We find wood scarcity to have a positive and significant effect on fertility. The effect of water scarcity is also positive, but not significant in general.

This paper considers application of interconnected game theory to modeling of bilateral agreements for sharing common pool resources under conditions of unequal access. Linking negotiations to issues with reciprocal benefits through interconnected game theory has been proposed in other settings to achieve international cooperation because it can avoid outcomes that are politically unacceptable due to the “victim pays” principle. Previous studies have not considered adequately the critical nature of this political infeasibility, if it exists, in determining advantages of interconnection. This paper investigates how game structure and benefits suggested by interconnected game theory are altered when victim pays strategies are removed from the feasibility set. Linking games is shown to have greater advantages than when the structural implications of eliminating victim pays strategies are not considered. Conversely, a class of cases exists where the full cooperation benefits of interconnection are attainable without linking through isolated component games when victim pays outcomes are feasible.

A common approach in modeling negotiations is to apply game theory to single issues. Recent work has suggested that the complexity of international negotiations can be better modeled by linking independent games. Successful linking is possible when the linked issues have compensating asymmetry of similar magnitude. An important result of linked games is that such games produce a greater feasible set of choices relative to the aggregated isolated games. In this paper, we demonstrate that achieving strict dominance of the linked game is not trivial and that results and implications depend on the structures of the isolated games.

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