International Water Resource Conflicts: Experience and Potential

International bilateral water treaty formation

“…' Just and Netanyahu [1998] support this idea when they state that ''asymmetric country characteristics'' are a major obstacle to the formation of a treaty. In contrast, Elhance [1999] suggests that ''although sovereign states are inherently inclined to exploit ''their'' water resources unilaterally, in the end even the strongest riparian states sharing international basins are compelled to seek some form of cooperation with their weaker neighbors.'…”

“…Just and Netanyahu [1998] describe ''obstacles'' to the formation of sustainable treaties, including asymmetric information, scientific gaps and technical uncertainties, enforcement limitation, desire for national sovereignty, conflicting national and international interests, asymmetric country characteristics, and upstream and downstream considerations. While dissimilarities might raise the cost of treaty formation, they would also be expected to hinder efficient informal cooperative management, increasing the need for (or expected benefit of) formal treaties.…”

“…Transaction costs of interaction and negotiation limit cooperative gains and may prevent formal cooperation, particularly as the number of parties involved in negotiation increases. Inefficiencies associated with multilateral negotiations may increase the likelihood of bilateral, rather than multilateral, treaty formation as a means of achieving some degree of cooperation with lower transaction costs [Just and Netanyahu, 1998]. …”

“…Quadratic terms for income differences are also estimated to determine if the marginal impact changes as the income difference grows. Previous literature suggests that differences in economic circumstances between countries can be a deterrent to treaty formation [Just and Netanyahu, 1998;Hirji and Grey, 1998]. However, if the more economically well off country in a bilateral negotiation desires to have a treaty formed, it might be able to wield power over the other country, or even compensate it for potential losses, suggesting that the impact of economic differences is ambiguous.…”

“…While international river basin management involves social, political, economic, hydrological and ecological dimensions, this study concentrates on those factors that influence the decision to negotiate and sign a treaty regarding the management of the water. There is a sizable body of literature on water rights [e.g., see Ditwiler, 1975;Johnson et al, 1981;Ostrom, 1962;Burness and Quirk, 1980;Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1992;Dudley, 1992] as well as on apportionment and river basin management [see Dinar and Loehman, 1995;Wescoat, 1995;Becker and Easter, 1998;Just and Netanyahu, 1998;Krutilla and Eckstein, 1970;Boisson de Chazournes, 1998;Hirji and Grey, 1998;Dellapenna, 1994;Wolf, 2000], yet no prior quantitative studies of international water treaty formation have been conducted.…”