Purpose The purpose of this paper is to elicit young economists’ job preferences through the use of a choice experiment (CE). Design/methodology/approach A CE conducted at a total of five universities in Spain, the Czech Republic and Germany. After estimating a random parameter logit model, the monetary value of the willingness to accept a specific job attribute is simulated. Findings The most important job characteristic, consistent across countries and universities, is a long-term career prospect at the company. Originality/value This is the first CE conducted on business and economics students’ job preferences in three European countries. Using the same survey instrument allows for the comparison of students’ job preferences across countries and also between private and public universities.

Using a political-frame-free, lab-in-the-field experiment, we investigate the associations between employment status, self-reported political ideology, and preferences for redistribution. The experiment consists of a real-effort task, followed by a four-player dictator game. In one treatment, dictator game initial endowments depend on participants’ performance in the real-effort task, i.e., they are earned, in the other, they are randomly determined. We find that being employed or unemployed is associated with revealed redistributive preferences, while the political ideology of the employed and unemployed is not. In contrast, the revealed redistributive preferences of students are strongly associated with their political ideologies. The employed and right-leaning students redistribute earnings less than windfalls, the unemployed, and left-leaning students make no such distinction.

We explore what researchers can gain or lose by using three widely used models for the analysis of discrete choice experiment data—the random parameter logit (RPL) with correlated parameters, the RPL with uncorrelated parameters and the hybrid choice model. Specifically, we analyze three data sets focused on measuring preferences to support a renewable energy programme to grow seaweed for biogas production. In spite of the fact that all three models can converge to very similar median WTP values, they cannot be used indistinguishably. Each model is based on different assumptions, which should be tested before their use. The fact that standard sample sizes usually applied in environmental valuation are generally unable to capture the outcome differences between the models cannot be used as a justification for their indistinct application.

Trading off visual disamenity for renewable energy: Willingness to pay for seaweed farming for energy production. Ecological Economics.

The first goal of this study is to examine the capacity of prominent survey-based effort proxies to predict real effort provision in children. Do children who “talk the talk” of hard work also “walk the walk” and make costly effort investments? The second goal is to assess how objective and subjective effort measures are related under two conditions: intrinsic (nonincentivized) motivation and extrinsic (incentivized) motivation. We measure objective “real” effort using three tasks and subjective self-reported effort using four psychological characteristics (conscientiousness, need for cognition, locus of control and delay of gratification) to understand to what extent material incentives affect the cognitive effort of children with different self-reported personalities. Data stem from real-effort experiments carried out with 420 fifth grade students from primary schools in Madrid, Spain. We find that some of the subjective and objective effort measures are positively correlated. Yet the power of personality to predict real effort is only moderate, but greater and more so in the extrinsic than the intrinsic motivation condition. In particular, need for cognition and conscientiousness are the most relevant correlates of objective effort. Overall, we find there is a big difference between saying and doing when it comes to exerting effort, and this difference is even larger when there are no direct material incentives in place to reward effort provision.