ATEL is one of the most expressive logics for reasoning about knowledge, time and strategies. Several issues around the interpretation of this logic are still unresolved. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by showing that agents do not have to know a specific strategy for doing something in order to have a capability. Furthermore we claim that agents can possess so-called strategic knowledge that is derived from their knowledge of strategies being played. In order to prove these claims we present an alternative interpretation of ATEL over extensive game forms. For the definition of abilities we use strategy domination, and to deal with strategic knowledge we include strategy profiles in the model. We illustrate the interpretation issues mentioned using several small examples. Furthermore we show how perfect recall and perfect memory can be characterized.
We are interested in applying model checking techniques to the verification of communication protocols which require safe communication. Typically, in such scenarios, one desires to demonstrate that one party can reliably communicate information to another party without a third party being able to determine this information. Our approach involves using the modal logic of knowledge, which has only relatively recently been studied in the context of secure protocols. We demonstrate our approach by means of a detailed case study: The Russian cards problem. This is an example of a security protocol with nontrivial requirements on the knowledge of the agents involved. Using the Russian cards problem as an example it is shown how the satisfaction of properties involving knowledge can be verified in a standard model checker -in our case, SPIN.
Agents often want to protect private information, while at the same acting upon the information. These two desires are in conflict, and this conflict can be modeled in strategic games where the utility not only depends on the expected value of the possible outcomes, but also on the information properties of the strategy an agent uses. In this paper we define two such games using the information theory concepts of entropy and relative entropy. For both games we compute optimal response strategies and establish the existence of Nash equilibria.but also on the information properties of the used strategy. These games are called minimal information games and most normal games and can be applied to the following situations.
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