ATEL is one of the most expressive logics for reasoning about knowledge, time and strategies. Several issues around the interpretation of this logic are still unresolved. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by showing that agents do not have to know a specific strategy for doing something in order to have a capability. Furthermore we claim that agents can possess so-called strategic knowledge that is derived from their knowledge of strategies being played. In order to prove these claims we present an alternative interpretation of ATEL over extensive game forms. For the definition of abilities we use strategy domination, and to deal with strategic knowledge we include strategy profiles in the model. We illustrate the interpretation issues mentioned using several small examples. Furthermore we show how perfect recall and perfect memory can be characterized.
Os esforços para reduzir o trauma num sistema forense contencioso são dificultados pela alegação de que o processo por abuso sexual não pode ser realizado sem que se observem os direitos do pretenso perpetrador. Inquirir uma criança-testemunha é uma tarefa muito especializada; os promotores e o advogado de defesa não estão treinados nestes métodos. Apesar disso, os serviços de intermediação para crianças-testemunhas num tribunal são importantes para reduzir o trauma experimentado pela criança. Este artigo objetiva destacar que os crimes contra crianças e os subseqüentes procedimentos criminais nos quais se exige que a criança participe como testemunha ocorrem com suficiente freqüência para que se garantam serviços de intermediação a todas as crianças-testemunhas. Ele destaca as implicações práticas a fim de melhorar o processo corrente de intermediação, em nível regional, provincial e nacional. Primeiramente, o artigo faz uma reflexão sobre os serviços de intermediação oferecidos a crianças-testemunhas em algumas áreas dos subúrbios da região oeste de Johannesburgo; em segundo lugar, discute experiências práticas e literatura de apoio, assim como a experiência da Bethany House com o projeto Child in Crisis Foundation (SA).
We present a monetary system by which selfish agents can cooperate reciprocally. We show that a straight-forward market mechanism can lead to unfair situations when agents misuse key positions. We show that it is not easy to retaliate wrongdoers, as there is a dominant strategy that deviates from the retaliating strategy. We present a monetary system in which every user can issue money and every user is required to sign each credit it issues or circulates. By using a trust-based credit-valuation function, wrongdoers are retaliated and it is no longer dominant to deviate from the retaliating strategy.
Abstract. We present a multiagent decision mechanism for the airport traffic control domain. It enables airlines to jointly decide on proposals for plan conflict solutions. The mechanism uses weighted voting for maximizing global utility and Clarke Tax to discourage manipulation. We introduce accounts to ensure that all agents are treated fairly, to some extent. The mechanism allows an airport to determine the pay-off between optimality and fairness of schedules. Also, it compensates for agents that happen to be in practically unfavourable positions.
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