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This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (NOV 95). The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation that operates three federally funded research and development centers to provide objective analyses of national security issues, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise, and conduct related research on other national challenges.

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. I N S T I T U T E F O R D E F E N S E A N A L Y S E S IDA Document D-4379The UXO Classification Demonstration at the Former Camp Butner, NC Michael Tuley Shelley Cazares Elizabeth Ayersiii Executive Summary IntroductionUnexploded ordnance (UXO) are munitions that were armed and fired but did not explode. Their risk of detonation remains, even decades after initial use. Thousands of sites in the United States are suspected of UXO contamination and require remediation. As much as 75% of current remediation costs may be associated with digging up nonhazardous scrap metal called "clutter," instead of UXO. The development, validation, and acceptance of reliable technologies to correctly classify buried targets as UXO or clutter could lead to a significant reduction in UXO remediation costs, allowing more land to be cleared for the same amount of funding.The Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) carried out the third live-site UXO classification demonstration at the former Camp Butner, NC in 2010. The main goal of the demonstration was to test and validate currently available and emerging classification technologies on a live site under operational conditions. Another goal was to involve environmental regulators, program managers, and other stakeholders in the design, execution, and evaluation of the demonstration to better understand what might be required in a real-world remediation project if detected targets were classified as clutter and therefore left in the ground. MethodsThe former Camp Butner was chosen to provide a greater challenge than the previous two demonstration sites. Historical records showed that a variety of munitions had been fired at Butner, including 37 mm projectiles similar in size to clutter. Thus, the estimated size of the buried target was not likely to be a discriminating feature in this demonstration, unlike in the previous two.Although this was a live-site demonstration, 160 inert UXO were seeded at the site, as in the previous two demonstrations. Clutter is common at live sites, but UXO is rare. Additional UXO must be seeded to confidently assess classification capabilities against a well-characterized and statistically significant set of targets.Three ...

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many threat detection systems, such as air cargo screeners and counter-improvised-explosive-device systems. Threat detection systems that perform well during testing are not always well received by the system operators, however. Some systems may frequently "cry wolf," generating false alarms when true threats are not present. As a result, operators lose faith in the systems-ignoring them or even turning them off and taking the chance that a true threat will not appear. This article reviews statistical concepts to reconcile the performance metrics that summarize a developer's view of a system during testing with the metrics that describe an operator's view of the system during real-world missions. Program managers can still make use of systems that "cry wolf" by arranging them into a tiered system that, overall, exhibits better performance than each individual system alone. https://doi.org/10.22594/dau.16-749.24.01 Keywords: probability of detection, probability of false alarm, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, prevalence DOI: