The Dow Chemical Company has significantly reduced the number of Tier 1 Process Safety events from 69 in 2008 to an average of 10 in 2013–2015. This paper will share some of the key elements that have led to this successful and sustainable reduction in incidents. The structure of the paper is focused around the concept of “Effective Process Safety Programs” published by Klein and Vaughen, Process Safety: Key Concepts and Practical Applications, CRC Press, 2017. In this paper, we will provide details on Dow's Operational Discipline systems that enable success on a day‐to‐day basis. These systems include Procedure Use Culture, Process Safety Training programs, and Process Safety Collaboration Networks. We will also describe our Process Safety Management Systems that enable long‐term success including Dow's Loss Prevention Principles (LPP), use of Process Hazards Analysis (PHA), Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and other tools to manage risk, and Dow's Mechanical Integrity program. The success is built on a strong foundation of Safety Culture and Leadership. This paper will illustrate how Dow is structured to support the Process Safety efforts and examples will be shared about how leadership at all levels of the organization is practiced and demonstrated. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 326–337, 2017
The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion on April 20, 2010, killed 11 workers, injured 16 others, and resulted in an offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry. As with all major incidents in industry, there are lessons to learn from systemic failures that resulted in the tragic loss of life, insult to the environment, and the equipment loss. Many companies, including The Dow Chemical Company, followed the subsequent investigation closely to determine which lessons could be leveraged to strengthen internal programs. Risk identification and management systems in Dow's Process and Occupational Safety programs are robust. Dow management systems are intended to meet or exceed Industry Standards with respect to design, operation, and layers of protection. The prevention of large scale accidents like Deepwater Horizon depends on an acute awareness of worst‐case scenarios and an unfailing vigilance to ensure that essential protection layers are not compromised. Dow management system reviews in 2011 on the same management systems involved in this incident identified opportunities for improvement and/or action plans in several areas. This article will focus on three programs that resulted from those management system reviews. The three programs are: a targeted High‐Consequence Emergency Response Drill program, a High Potential Process Safety Near Miss Program, and technology‐specific Process Safety Cardinal Rules. For each of the three programs, a description of the content of the program and how it was implemented at the company level is provided. Specific examples of how these programs were implemented at a facility level are included. Each of these programs play a key role in preventing a catastrophic event and have been a part of Dow's continuing process safety performance improvement over the last several years. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 335–344, 2015
Most modern ethylene cracking furnaces use closecoupled extractive or in situ oxygen analyzers based on a zirconium oxide sensor in the stack area to provide fast and reliable measurement of the oxygen content of the flue gas exiting the firebox. This allows for precise control of the excess combustion air in the firebox, resulting in higher energy efficiency for the furnace than is typical using conventional extractive sample-based analyzer systems where the analyzer might be several hundred feet away from the sample point. These analyzers use a zirconium oxide sensing element that operates at 7008C, which is well above the auto-ignition temperature of many flammable hydrocarbon mixtures. Although flame arrestors can be installed on these analyzers to prevent flame propagation from the probe element into the firebox there are still situations that can exist that the analyzer can pose as an ignition source. This paper will discuss the two typical zirconium oxide oxygen analyzer designs and how the analyzer can be a source of ignition, and review an incident in a Dow cracking furnace, which resulted from an in situ oxygen analyzer igniting a flammable mixture in a furnace. Corrective actions are included in this paper.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.