The Dow Chemical Company has significantly reduced the number of Tier 1 Process Safety events from 69 in 2008 to an average of 10 in 2013–2015. This paper will share some of the key elements that have led to this successful and sustainable reduction in incidents. The structure of the paper is focused around the concept of “Effective Process Safety Programs” published by Klein and Vaughen, Process Safety: Key Concepts and Practical Applications, CRC Press, 2017. In this paper, we will provide details on Dow's Operational Discipline systems that enable success on a day‐to‐day basis. These systems include Procedure Use Culture, Process Safety Training programs, and Process Safety Collaboration Networks. We will also describe our Process Safety Management Systems that enable long‐term success including Dow's Loss Prevention Principles (LPP), use of Process Hazards Analysis (PHA), Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and other tools to manage risk, and Dow's Mechanical Integrity program. The success is built on a strong foundation of Safety Culture and Leadership. This paper will illustrate how Dow is structured to support the Process Safety efforts and examples will be shared about how leadership at all levels of the organization is practiced and demonstrated. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 326–337, 2017
In the late 1980s, DuPont defined Operational Discipline (OD) as the deeply rooted dedication and commitment by each member of an organization to carry out each task, the right way, each time. Many other companies have similar “operational discipline” definitions, and this emphasis has not changed. Furthermore, the dedication and commitment to OD has grown stronger. Operational discipline continues to reflect the strength of an organization's safety culture in making process safety programs effective and in providing tangible results for preventing injuries and incidents through effective process safety systems. What has changed is how we better apply Operational Discipline as one of the three essential process safety foundations. When combined with both a strong safety culture and leadership and robust process safety systems, the company's strong Operational Discipline foundation helps improve process safety performance. This article describes how collaborative efforts have helped us to better evaluate Operational Discipline in context of the Risk Based Process Safety's element Conduct of Operations, briefly presents how OD programs can be implemented using an example from the Dow Chemical Company, and provides some practical guidance and approaches that a company can use on their process safety journey to improve their OD program. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 478–492, 2018
Layer of Protection Analysis is a powerful tool for quantitative risk assessments. If applied correctly, it can provide quick and efficient guidance on what additional safeguards are needed, if any, to protect against a given scenario. If misapplied, an overly conservative calculation of risk may result in over‐instrumentation, additional life‐cycle costs, and spurious trips. A nonconservative calculation of risk could result in an under‐protected system and unacceptable risk of an undesired consequence occurring. This article describes several categories of common errors, some overly conservative and some nonconservative. Case studies of actual plant scenarios are used to illustrate. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009
The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion on April 20, 2010, killed 11 workers, injured 16 others, and resulted in an offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry. As with all major incidents in industry, there are lessons to learn from systemic failures that resulted in the tragic loss of life, insult to the environment, and the equipment loss. Many companies, including The Dow Chemical Company, followed the subsequent investigation closely to determine which lessons could be leveraged to strengthen internal programs. Risk identification and management systems in Dow's Process and Occupational Safety programs are robust. Dow management systems are intended to meet or exceed Industry Standards with respect to design, operation, and layers of protection. The prevention of large scale accidents like Deepwater Horizon depends on an acute awareness of worst‐case scenarios and an unfailing vigilance to ensure that essential protection layers are not compromised. Dow management system reviews in 2011 on the same management systems involved in this incident identified opportunities for improvement and/or action plans in several areas. This article will focus on three programs that resulted from those management system reviews. The three programs are: a targeted High‐Consequence Emergency Response Drill program, a High Potential Process Safety Near Miss Program, and technology‐specific Process Safety Cardinal Rules. For each of the three programs, a description of the content of the program and how it was implemented at the company level is provided. Specific examples of how these programs were implemented at a facility level are included. Each of these programs play a key role in preventing a catastrophic event and have been a part of Dow's continuing process safety performance improvement over the last several years. © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 335–344, 2015
In 2007, the American Petroleum Institute (API 521/ISO 23251) published guidance on the use of High Integrity Protective Systems (HIPS) to mitigate overpressure scenarios. A natural extension of HIPS is to use system design and operating discipline to mitigate overpressure scenarios where use of fully instrumented protection layers or conventional relief devices is neither practical nor effective. In Dow, this approach is referred to as Alternate Overpressure Protection (AOP). System design (HIPS or AOP) is commonly used to mitigate overpressure scenarios when: (1) a conventional pressure relief device (PRD) is not practical or effective, (2) a conventional PRD will not be reliable or (3) a conventional PRD will work but is not cost effective. HIPS or AOP can also be used to reduce the required relief size by limiting the operating window of the process. The purpose of this article is to provide several practical examples on the use of HIPS and AOP and to describe some of the challenges and associated strategies to ensure successful implementation and sustained process safety performance. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 248–254, 2013
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