The article defends the classical version of ministerial responsibility against recent initiatives to implement a form of direct accountability for administrators. Constitutional convention and ministerial resignations from active cabinets in the Canadian federal government and in Britain are described: in neither country do ministers resign for maladministration by their officials, nor does doctrine suggest they should. Rather, the pattern of resignations indicates the importance of collective responsibility, as well as the relative unimportance of ministerial misbehaviour. The conclusion sets out the negative implications for democratic government of substituting a kind of direct “accountability” of officials, extracted in political forums, for the responsibility of ministers.
Abstract. Since 1973, important changes have been brought about in the powers of the Office of the Auditor General. The balance of our system of parliamentary government is undermined by these changes. This paper argues that the Auditor General's value‐for‐money campaign has taken the oag over the line between audit and trespass on government policy. The Office's new powers have their legal basis in the new Auditor General Act of 1977, which says that the oag can review value‐for‐money studies of programs. Another term for these studies is ‘effectiveness evaluations. The powers acquired in the act made the creation of the new central agency, the Office of the Comptroller General, inevitable. Among this agency's responsibilities is the duty to ensure that each of government's programs is reviewed for value‐for‐money, to satisfy the requirements of the Auditor General. The two agencies thus exist in a situation of mutual obligation and legitimation. The paper further argues that value‐for‐money audit is not an objective review technique, but involves a great deal of judgment in each of its stages of application. It is not fitting, therefore, that reports generated under its procedures should be reviewed externally, by an officer without any electoral base. This implies that government requires some form of legitimation to govern quite outside normal conceptions of parliamentary government. Next, it is argued that the techniques of classic program evaluation are themselves biased toward demonstrations of program failure. As the post of Auditor General of Canada fell vacant in September, 1980, and a new Auditor General will be appointed, the government should take the opportunity to review the responsibilities and privileges of the Office. Sommaire. Depuis 1973, les pouvoirs du poste de vérificateur général ont subi ďimportants changements. ľéquilibre de notre système de gouvemement parlementaire est affaibli par ces changements. ľauteur de cette étude pense que la eampagne ← en avoir pour son argent → du vérificateur général lui a fait franchir la limite entre vérification et ingéience dans la politique gouverne‐mentale. Les nouveaux pouvoirs du poste ont leur fondement légal dans la nouvelle loi du vérificateur général de 1977 qui ľautorise à examiner les programmes du point de vue coûts/résultats. Ces études portent aussi un autre nom, celui ďévaluation de ľefficacité. Ces pouvoirs, entérinés par la loi, rendirent inévitable la création ďun nouvel organisme central, le bureau du contrôleur général. Parmi les responsabilités de cet organisme se trouve celle de s'assurer que tous les programmes gouvernementaux sont étudés du point de vue coûts/résultats pour satisfaire aux exigences du vérificateur général. Ces deux offices existent done dans une situation ďobligation et de légitimation mutuelles. Ľauteur soutient de plus que la vérification coûts/résultats n'est pas une technique ďexamen objective mais qu'elle fait beaucoup appel au juge‐ment dans ses differénts stades ďapplication. II n'est done pas acceptable q...
Sixteen Canadian master's programs of public administration, management and policy were compared in terms of institutional location, admission and degree requirements and compulsory curriculum. Only basic programs were included; joint degrees or specialized programs in specialized fields (like international or development administration) were omitted because they make comparison extremely difficult. Even the programs retained vary greatly in duration and content. Certain clusters of orientation and emphasis are evident. In comparison with the curriculum standards of the American National Association of Schools and Programs of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA), Canadian schools tend to emphasize policy at the expense of management. Sommaire: Seize programmes canadiens de maitrise en administration, gestion et politiques publiques ont été comparés selon leur situation institutionnelle, leurs conditions d'admission et d'obtention de diplôme ainsi que de curriculum obliga‐toire. Seuls les programmes de base ont été retenus, les doubles diplômes ou les programmes spécialisés ‐ tels que l'administration internationale ou de développement ‐ ont étéécartés en raison des difficultés de comparaison. Même les programmes retenus varient beaucoup dans leur durée et leur contenu. Certains regroupements d'orientation et de spécialisation sont évidents. Comparés aux standards de cursus de I'Association nationale américaine des écoles d'affaires et d'administration publiques (NASPAA), les programmes canadiens tendent à privilégier l'analyse de politiques aux dépens du management.
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