Should regulators encourage the migration of trade from over-the-counter (OTC) to centralized markets? To address this question, we study a model in which banks make costly decisions to participate in an OTC market, a centralized market, or both markets at the same time. Banks differ in their ability to take large positions, what we call their trading capacity. In equilibrium, intermediate-capacity banks find it optimal to participate in the centralized market. In contrast, low-and high-capacity banks find it optimal to participate in the OTC market, due to an endogenous complementarity. Namely, low capacity banks receive worse terms of trade than in the centralized market but better risk sharing, thanks to the intermediation services offered by high-capacity banks. High-capacity banks receive worse risk sharing than in the centralized market, but profit from the provision of intermediation services to low-capacity banks. While the social optimum has qualitatively similar participation patterns, it prescribes that more customers migrate to the centralized market, and that more dealers enter the OTC market.

I develop a search‐and‐bargaining model of endogenous intermediation in over‐the‐counter markets. Unlike the existing work, my model allows for rich investor heterogeneity in three simultaneous dimensions: preferences, inventories, and meeting rates. By comparing trading‐volume patterns that arise in my model and are observed in practice, I argue that the heterogeneity in meeting rates is the main driver of intermediation patterns. I find that investors with higher meeting rates (i.e., fast investors) are less averse to holding inventories and more attracted to cash earnings, which makes the model corroborate a number of stylized facts that do not emerge from existing models: (i) fast investors provide intermediation by charging a speed premium, and (ii) fast investors hold more extreme inventories. Then, I use the model to study the effect of trading frictions on the supply and price of liquidity. On social welfare, I show that the interaction of meeting rate heterogeneity with optimal inventory management makes the equilibrium inefficient. I provide a financial transaction tax/subsidy scheme that corrects this inefficiency, in which fast investors cross‐subsidize slow investors.

I develop a search-and-bargaining model of liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets where investors di¤er in their search intensities. A distinguishing characteristic of my model is its tractability: it allows for heterogeneity, unrestricted asset positions, and fully decentralized trade. I …nd that investors with higher search intensities (i.e., fast investors) are less averse to holding inventories and more attracted to cash earnings, which makes the model corroborate a number of stylized facts that do not emerge from existing models: (i) fast investors provide intermediation by charging a speed premium, and (ii) fast investors hold larger and more volatile inventories. Then, I use the model to study the e¤ect of trading frictions on the supply and price of liquidity. The results have policy implications concerning the Volcker rule.JEL classi…cation: G1; G11; G12; G21; D83; D53; D61 Keywords: Search frictions; Bargaining; Price dispersion; Financial intermediation Contact info: Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 100 International Drive, Baltimore, MD 21202. Email address: semihuslu@jhu.edu. I am deeply indebted to Pierre-Olivier Weill for his supervision, his encouragement, many detailed comments, and suggestions. I also would like to thank, for fruitful discussions and comments,

The aim of this study was to identify the sociodemographic characteristics of pregnant women who have visited the pregnancy clinic and to investigate their relationship with anxiety. Materials and Methods: 90 pregnant women who visited the Pregnancy Clinic of Bülent Ecevit University Health Application and Research Center between February-April 2018 were included in the study. The sociodemographic questionnaire and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) were conducted among the pregnant women included in the study. Findings: In our study, anxiety was detected in 70% of pregnant women according to BAI scores. Among the sociodemographic data that we investigated, only unintended pregnancy statistically increased the anxiety in the patients. Conclusion: A high prevalence of anxiety is seen among pregnant women. Besides, despite the lack of contraceptive use, the majority of pregnant women reported that their pregnancies have been unplanned and this situation is the most significant factor that increases anxiety among pregnant women. We think that the couples should be more conscious about planned pregnancies, general ignorance about pregnancy increases anxiety and determination of associated factors will make an important contribution to the health of pregnant women.