We propose a model in which assets with identical cash f lows can trade at different prices. Infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, a higher lending fee ("specialness"), and trades at a premium consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for small frictions, and provide a calibration generating realistic on-the-run premia.
We study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks when agents learn from nominal prices. While public releases have the benefit of providing new information, they can have the cost of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system. We show that, when agents have private information about monetary shocks, the cost can dominate, in that public releases increase uncertainty about fundamentals. In some cases, public releases can create or eliminate multiple equilibria. Our results are robust to adding velocity shocks, imperfectly observable prices, large idiosyncratic shocks, and introducing a bond market.
During financial disruptions, market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure. They buy when the pressure is large, accumulate inventories, and sell when the pressure alleviates. This paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure and order-execution delays. I show that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity, provided they have access to sufficient capital. If raising capital is costly, this suggests a policy role for lenient central bank lending during financial disruptions. Copyright 2007 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices.Agents enter into an infinite-horizon, steady-state market to establish long or short positions.Both the spot and the asset-lending market operate through search. Short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. As a result, that asset enjoys both greater liquidity, measured by search times, and a higher lending fee ("specialness"). Liquidity and specialness translate into price premia that are consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for small frictions, and can generate price differentials in line with observed on-the-run premia.
This paper develops a search-theoretic model of the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns, abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity. I derive a float-adjusted return model (FARM), explaining the pricing of liquidity with a simple linear formula: In equilibrium, the liquidity spread of an asset is proportional to the inverse of its free float, the portion of its market capitalization available for sale. This suggests that the free float is an appropriate measure of liquidity, consistent with the linear specifications commonly estimated in the empirical literature.The qualitative predictions of the model corroborate much of the empirical evidence.
We study the efficiency of liquidity provision by dealers and the desirability of policy intervention in over-the-counter (OTC) markets during crises. We emphasizes two OTC frictions: finding counterparties takes time, and trade is bilateral and involves bargaining.We model a crisis as a shock that reduces investors' asset demands, lasting until a random recovery time. In this context, dealers can provide liquidity to investors by accumulating asset inventories. When OTC frictions are severe, even well capitalized dealers may not find it privately optimal to accumulate inventories, and direct purchase by the government can improve welfare.
This paper develops a search-theoretic model of the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns, abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity. I derive a float-adjusted return model (FARM), explaining the pricing of liquidity with a simple linear formula: In equilibrium, the liquidity spread of an asset is proportional to the inverse of its free float, the portion of its market capitalization available for sale. This suggests that the free float is an appropriate measure of liquidity, consistent with the linear specifications commonly estimated in the empirical literature.The qualitative predictions of the model corroborate much of the empirical evidence.
We investigate the 30 year increase in the level and dispersion of house prices across U.S. metropolitan areas in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium island model. The model is based on two main assumptions: households flow in and out metropolitan areas in response to local wage shocks, and the housing supply cannot adjust instantly because of regulatory constraints. In our equilibrium, house prices compensate for crosssectional wage differences. Feeding in our model the 30 year increase in cross-sectional wage dispersion that we document based on metropolitan-level data, we generate the observed increase in house price level and dispersion. The calibration also reveals that, while a baseline level of regulation is important, a tightening of regulation by itself cannot account for the increase in house price level and dispersion: in equilibrium, workers flow out of tightly regulated towards less regulated metropolitan areas, undoing most of the price impact of additional local supply regulations. Finally, the calibration with increasing wage dispersion suggests that the welfare effects of housing supply regulation are large. *
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