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This paper examines the impact of take-back laws within a manufacturer/remanufacturer competitive framework. Take-back laws require that firms take responsibility for the collection/disposal costs of their products. We consider two alternative implementations of take-back laws that are distinguished by the degree of control that the manufacturer has on returns sold to the remanufacturer. In one implementation, known as collective WEEE take-back, the manufacturer has no control over returns sold to the remanufacturer. The other implementation, known as individual WEEE take-back, gives complete control to the manufacturer.We develop a general two-period model to investigate questions of interest to policy-makers in government and managers in industry. Our results suggest that, in some settings, enactment of collective WEEE take-back will result in higher manufacturer and remanufacturer profits while simultaneously spurring remanufacturing activity and reducing the tax burden on society. A negative effect is higher consumer prices in the market. In other settings, we find that collective WEEE take-back introduces a structural change to the industry-creating an environment where remanufacturing becomes profitable when it is not profitable without a takeback law. With respect to individual WEEE take-back, we find that the manufacturer often benefits from allowing the remanufacturer to enter the market, though from a government policy-maker perspective, there are clear risks of monopolistic behavior. #

Economies of scale are fundamental to manufacturing operations. With respect to scheduling, this phenomenon manifests itself in efficiencies gained from grouping similar jobs together. This paper reviews the rapidly growing literature on single-machine scheduling models that incorporate benefits from job grouping. We focus on three basic models known as family scheduling with item availability, family scheduling with batch availability, and batch processing. We present known results and introduce new results, and we pay special attention to key theoretical properties and the use of these properties in optimization procedures.

This article considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single manufacturer is selling a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. It differs from traditional supply chain contract models in two ways. First, while traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, this article takes the viewpoint of behavioral principal-agency theory and assumes the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. Second, while gain/loss (GL) sharing is common in practice, there is a lack of analysis of GL-sharing contracts in the supply chain contract literature. This article investigates the role of a GL-sharing provision for mitigating the loss-aversion effect, which drives down the retailer order quantity and total supply chain profit. We analyze contracts that include GL-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) credit provisions as well as the special cases of GL contracts and buyback contracts. Our analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain, manufacturer, and retailer performance. In particular, we show that there exists a special class of distribution-free GLB contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and retailer; in contrast with other contracts, the parameter values for contracts in this class do not depend on the probability distribution of market demand. This feature is meaningful in practice because (i) the probability distribution of demand faced by a retailer is typically unknown by the manufacturer and (ii) a manufacturer can offer the same contract to multiple noncompeting retailers that differ by demand distribution and still coordinate the supply chains.

This paper studies the role of the yield-dependent trading cost structure influencing the optimal choice of the selling price and production quantity for a firm that operates under supply uncertainty in the agricultural industry. The firm initially leases farm space, but its realized amount of fruit supply fluctuates because of weather conditions, diseases, etc. At the end of the growing season, the firm has three options: convert its crop supply to the final product, purchase additional supplies from other growers, and sell some (or all) of its crop supply in the open market without converting to the finished product. We consider the problem both from a risk-neutral and a risk-averse perspective with varying degrees of risk aversion. The paper offers three sets of contributions: (1) It shows that the use of a static cost exaggerates the initial investment in the farm space and the expected profit significantly, and the actual value gained from a secondary (emergency) option for an agricultural firm is lower under the yield-dependent cost structure. (2) It proves that although the risk-neutral firm does not benefit from fruit futures, a sufficiently risk-averse firm can benefit from the presence of a fruit futures market. The same risk-averse firm does not purchase fruit futures when it operates under static costs. Thus, fruit futures can only add value under yield-dependent trading costs. (3) Contrary to the results presented for the newsvendor problem under demand uncertainty, the firm does not always commit to a lower initial quantity (leased farm space) under risk aversion. Rather, the firm might lease a larger farm space under risk aversion.

D espite high demand and resource limitations, humanitarian organizations (HOs) typically do not share resources and/or coordinate in the field. While coordination enhances operational performance and saves costs, the general perception is that it dilutes the media attention that individual organizations might receive, and negatively influences their future donation income. In this study, we empirically unveil the impact of media exposure and operational performance on the donations obtained by HOs. Then, based on the empirical results, we develop a stylized model to characterize the structure of preferred coordination policies with respect to an organization's funding source and main mandate. Our findings shed light on the incentives and dynamics that drive behaviors in humanitarian operations and provide insights for policy makers on designing and implementing mechanisms that encourage humanitarian coordination.

Two people are placed randomly and independently on a street of unit length. They attempt to find each other in the shortest possible expected time. We solve this problem, assuming each searcher knows where he or she is on the street, for monotonic density functions for the initial placement (this includes the uniform pdf as a special case). This gives an example of a rendezvous search problem where there is no advantage in being allowed to use asymmetric strategies. We also solve some corresponding problems for the circle when asymmetric strategies are permitted: One of these shows that it can sometimes be optimal for one player to wait for the other to find him.