Recent historic observed lows in Arctic sea ice extent, together with climate model projections of additional ice reductions in the future, have fueled speculations of potential new trans-Arctic shipping routes linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. However, numerical studies of how projected geophysical changes in sea ice will realistically impact ship navigation are lacking. To address this deficiency, we analyze seven climate model projections of sea ice properties, assuming two different climate change scenarios [representative concentration pathways (RCPs) 4.5 and 8.5] and two vessel classes, to assess future changes in peak season (September) Arctic shipping potential. By midcentury, changing sea ice conditions enable expanded September navigability for common open-water ships crossing the Arctic along the Northern Sea Route over the Russian Federation, robust new routes for moderately ice-strengthened (Polar Class 6) ships over the North Pole, and new routes through the Northwest Passage for both vessel classes. Although numerous other nonclimatic factors also limit Arctic shipping potential, these findings have important economic, strategic, environmental, and governance implications for the region.climate change | human-environment | marine transportation modeling | Arctic maritime development | global change

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Climate models project continued Arctic sea ice reductions with nearly ice-free summer conditions by the mid-21st century. However, how such reductions will realistically enable marine access is not well understood, especially considering a range of climatic scenarios and ship types. We present 21st century projections of technical shipping accessibility for circumpolar and national scales, the international high seas, and three potential navigation routes. Projections of marine access are based on monthly and daily CCSM4 sea ice concentration and thickness simulations for 2011-2030, 2046-2065, and 2080-2099 under 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 W/m 2 radiative forcing scenarios. Results suggest substantial areas of the Arctic will become newly accessible to Polar Class 3, Polar Class 6, and open-water vessels, rising from~54 %, 36 %, and 23 %, respectively of the circumpolar International Maritime Organization Guidelines Boundary area in the late 20th century to~95 %, 78 %, and 49 %, respectively by the late 21st century. Of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states, Russia experiences the greatest percentage access increases to its exclusive economic zone, followed by Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Canada and the U.S. Along the Northern Sea Route, July-October navigation season length averages~120, 113, and 103 days for PC3, PC6, and OW vessels, respectively by late-century, with shorter seasons but substantial increases along the Northwest Passage and Trans-Polar Route. While Arctic navigation depends on other factors besides sea ice including economics, infrastructure, bathymetry, and weather, these projections are useful for strategic planning by governments, regulatory agencies, and the global maritime industry to assess spatial and temporal ranges of potential Arctic marine operations in the coming decades.

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Though climate models exhibit broadly similar agreement on key long-term trends, they have significant temporal and spatial differences due to intermodel variability. Such variability should be considered when using climate models to project the future marine Arctic. Here we present multiple scenarios of 21st-century Arctic marine access as driven by sea ice output from 10 CMIP5 models known to represent well the historical trend and climatology of Arctic sea ice. Optimal vessel transits from North America and Europe to the Bering Strait are estimated for two periods representing early-century (2011-2035) and mid-century (2036-2060) conditions under two forcing scenarios (RCP 4.5/8.5), assuming Polar Class 6 and open-water vessels with medium and no ice-breaking capability, respectively. Results illustrate that projected shipping viability of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage (NWP) depends critically on model choice. The eastern Arctic will remain the most reliably accessible marine space for trans-Arctic shipping by mid-century, while outcomes for the NWP are particularly model-dependent. Omitting three models (GFDL-CM3, MIROC-ESM-CHEM, and MPI-ESM-MR), our results would indicate minimal NWP potential even for routes from North America. Furthermore, the relative importance of the NSR will diminish over time as the number of viable central Arctic routes increases gradually toward mid-century. Compared to vessel class, climate forcing plays a minor role. These findings reveal the importance of model choice in devising projections for strategic planning by governments, environmental agencies, and the global maritime industry.

As global temperatures increase, sea ice loss will increasingly enable commercial shipping traffic to cross the Arctic Ocean, where the ships' gas and particulate emissions may have strong regional effects. Here we investigate impacts of shipping emissions on Arctic climate using a fully coupled Earth system model (CESM 1.2.2) and a suite of newly developed projections of 21st‐century trans‐Arctic shipping emissions. We find that trans‐Arctic shipping will reduce Arctic warming by nearly 1 °C by 2099, due to sulfate‐driven liquid water cloud formation. Cloud fraction and liquid water path exhibit significant positive trends, cooling the lower atmosphere and surface. Positive feedbacks from sea ice growth‐induced albedo increases and decreased downwelling longwave radiation due to reduced water vapor content amplify the cooling relative to the shipping‐free Arctic. Our findings thus point to the complexity in Arctic climate responses to increased shipping traffic, justifying further study and policy considerations as trade routes open.

The “network” has gained widespread acceptance within economic geography as a metaphor for economic interaction. Consistent with a global production network (GPN) approach, extractive industries are deeply embedded in political structures, physical infrastructure, and environmental conditions. We advocate for a GPN framework that emphasizes the co-operation of multiple, differentiated networks at each stage of a production network. Furthermore, the physical geography of sub-national spaces as well as trans-national spaces linking resources with destination markets imposes critical constraints on the structure and operation of oil and natural-gas extraction. We attempt to move beyond notions of a singular network encompassing all aspects of production by contextualizing extractive activities within the geopolitical economy of Arctic Russia. Our aim is twofold: to develop a more carefully articulated conception of networks based on the different economic principles and political regulation at work within different types of networks, and to show how the Russian Arctic oil and gas sector can only be adequately understood with such a nuanced approach. The Arctic case illustrates well the complex entanglement of the state and political actors in networks of firms and specialized transport systems. We first deconstruct the network concept to establish the economic principles, actors, and spaces that comprise the extractive production network, and then examine the extractive hydrocarbon networks active in Arctic Russia through this analytical lens.

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