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This paper explores blockchain technology's potential to alter contracting both in the market and within organizations. We identify and discuss how blockchain reduces certain types of transaction costs while introducing additional costs that have not been present in traditional contracts. Blockchain technology also presents a new method to mitigate or avoid certain types of agency costs that stem from contracting with agents inside the firm. Through this theoretical discussion, our paper proposes several avenues for future research on how blockchain may alter contracting and corporate governance.

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This paper explores the extent to which CEO ideological divergence influences firm lobbying strategy. Because a CEO’s political ideological disposition is shown to affect firm outcomes, we theorize there are nonmarket strategic implications when the governing party is divergent or convergent from their ideology. Accordingly, we integrate insights from organizational fit literature regarding value congruence and strategic complementarity in order to examine whether CEO political ideological divergence affects lobbying investment and changes the balance between internal and external lobbying activities. Further, we theorize that these outcomes are less pronounced for firms that are highly regulated. Our results support our theorizing, therefore, by identifying how CEO ideology interacts with the opposing political ideology. We unpack the ways in which CEO political ideology influences firm political behavior, thus extending research on CEO political ideology and lobbying.

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