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This study examines the relationship between alternative university governance practices and staff well‐being. Specifically, it investigates how people in academic and professional services roles are managed and how various governance mechanisms such as the use of performance measures and targets influence their sense of vitality and stress. Drawing from agency theory and stewardship theory research, the authors expected universities to align their governance practices to the nature of their employment roles to enhance well‐being. Based on data collected in the UK, the authors find that, for some academic roles, there is a misalignment between the responsibilities and job demands and the way institutions govern people in such roles, which is shown to affect their well‐being. These results suggest that well‐being responses to governance mechanisms change, depending on the role an employee performs and the position he or she occupies. Interestingly, these data suggest that the governance and well‐being experiences of academic leaders are more closely aligned with those of professional service leaders than with those of academics without leadership positions. Taking these data together, this investigation notes several shortcomings in the internal governance practices of higher‐education institutions that can have unexpected consequences and require close attention and further research.

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This paper explores the extent to which CEO ideological divergence influences firm lobbying strategy. Because a CEO’s political ideological disposition is shown to affect firm outcomes, we theorize there are nonmarket strategic implications when the governing party is divergent or convergent from their ideology. Accordingly, we integrate insights from organizational fit literature regarding value congruence and strategic complementarity in order to examine whether CEO political ideological divergence affects lobbying investment and changes the balance between internal and external lobbying activities. Further, we theorize that these outcomes are less pronounced for firms that are highly regulated. Our results support our theorizing, therefore, by identifying how CEO ideology interacts with the opposing political ideology. We unpack the ways in which CEO political ideology influences firm political behavior, thus extending research on CEO political ideology and lobbying.