Deep disagreements are disagreements wherein the dialectical conditions for fruitful argumentative exchange do not obtain. One view from within these disagreements is that the other side has been duped or is so deeply ignorant of and complacent with some illusion, there is no hope for exchange. The Dark Enlightenment's critique of liberal democracy and progressive politics (which gave rise to the alt‐right movement) proceeds on this premise, calling their critical philosophy ‘the red pill’ and terming the opposition's program ‘the Cathedral’. Despite the depth of their disagreement with progressives, there is evidence for an optimistic program of critical dialogue in this instance of deep disagreement.
The authors identify and offer an analysis of a new form of the Straw Man fallacy, and then explore the implications of the prevalence of this fallacy for contemporary political discourse.KEY WORDS: argumentation, dialectic, fallacies, political discourse, straw man fallacy I According to a widely accepted characterization, one commits the straw man fallacy when one misrepresents an opponent's position in a way that imputes to it implausible commitments, and then refutes the misrepresentation instead of the opponent's actual view. 1 This analysis of the fallacy has given rise to a range of theoretical and practical concerns about how one should discern what an arguer's actual (as opposed to her misrepresented) position is and how to correct such misrepresentations. Additionally, there are questions concerning the precise relation of the straw man fallacy to other fallacies; some theorists have wondered whether the straw man fallacy so described is a sub-species of hasty generalization (Chase, 1956, 40), ad hominem (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1987, 286), or a failure of internal proof or a secundium quid fallacy (Vernon and Nissen, 1968, 160; Walton, 1992, 75-80).In this paper, our objective is not to challenge the standing theoretical, practical, or classificatory work regarding this fallacy. Instead we will make a case for broadening our conception of the fallacy beyond the form presented in the standard analysis. 2 Specifically, we will introduce a distinction between two forms of the straw man fallacy: the form of representation, and the form of selection.
In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not only in terms of improving the quality of the group's present decisions, but also improving the background conditions for continued group deliberation. The authors sketch a preliminary schedule of these groupdeliberative virtues modelled on Aristotle's conception of virtue as the mean between two extreme vices.The virtues discussed in this article include deliberative wit, friendliness, empathy, charity, temperance, courage, sincerity, and humility.In this paper, we will argue for two main claims and underscore one of their practical implications for the cultivation of democratic citizens. The first and weaker claim is that it is often better to deliberate in groups than to deliberate by oneself, because the epistemic results of group deliberation can, in certain cases, outshine the epistemic results of solitary deliberation ( §1). The second and more important claim for our purposes is that, while group deliberation may help move us toward achieving superior epistemic results, deliberating in groups is not by itself sufficient. We must additionally engage in and engender group deliberation that proceeds in the right sort of way -as we will suggest, with group-deliberative virtue ( §1 and §2). A practical implication of our two claims is that communities of truth-seekers -including communities of teachers and students, as well as democratic citizens more generally -need forums of group deliberation that cultivate these virtues. Thus, it makes sense for us to attend to the development and practice of these virtues both in ourselves and others. Ultimately, following Aristotle, we will sketch a preliminary schedule of these group-deliberative virtues ( §3), and, finally we will briefly explain what distinguishes them from strictly epistemic virtues ( §4).Among philosophers, at least, deliberative virtues do not always get the attention they deserve. Even if it is common nowadays to value democratic ideals and group deliberation, Descartes and Plato seem to heavily influence the way philosophy (at least) is taught. Reflecting a certain Cartesian heritage, philosophy courses often equip students far more for solitary inquiry than for group deliberation. And in line with Plato's preference for aristocracy over democracy, 1 students are often moulded more into would-be experts than into citizens ready for democratic public exchange. Socrates' dialogical form is often treated as ancillary to concerns about politics, knowledge, and metaphysics. Consequently, the preparation students ...
Pragmatism's naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition's anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must answer the phenomenological tradition's criticisms of naturalism.A good deal of recent work in the pragmatist tradition purports to be phenomenological in spirit or informed by the insights of phenomenology. 1 In light of the pragmatist tradition's commitment to naturalism and the phenomenological tradition's overt anti-naturalism, the question is whether this cross-traditional work is methodologically coherent. A background question, of course, is whether phenomenology is consistent with any naturalist program in the social sciences. I will argue here that a pragmatic naturalism is committed to epistemic and ontological naturalism and a broad form of humanism. Phenomenology is relevant to pragmatism's humanism, but it is inconsistent with pragmatism's epistemic and ontological naturalisms. As a consequence, pragmatists face a dilemma: either they must reject the essentialist picture of pragmatism as a naturalism or they must reject the phenomenological tradition as antinaturalistic. If they take the first horn of the dilemma, pragmatism as a philosophical method becomes inscrutable. If they take the second horn of the dilemma, for better or worse, pragmatism becomes methodologically isolated from phenomenology, and in turn, that isolation must be attended to more carefully. Further, if the dilemma is right, pragmatists should be bound to answer phenomenologists' criticisms of naturalism, as those criticisms are at least implicitly criticisms of pragmatism. That is, if the reasons behind the phenomenological tradition's anti-naturalism are right, then pragmatism is an incoherent philosophical program.
Three forms of the straw man fallacy are posed: the straw, weak, and hollow man. Additionally, there can be non-fallacious cases of any of these species of straw man arguments.Keywords Straw man Á Weak man Á Fallacy theory One encounters the straw man virtually anywhere there is an argument. This is especially so in the heated exchanges about politics and religion on Cable TV talk shows, talk radio, internet discussion forums, and newspaper op-ed pages. Most students know the straw man as a type of fallacy of reasoning wherein one misrepresents the argument of an opponent and thereby easily defeats the weakened version and claims victory over the original, stronger argument. This picture of the straw man is the prevailing one in textbooks.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.