Developing Group‐Deliberative Virtues

Abstract

In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not only in terms of improving the quality of the group's present decisions, but also improving the background conditions for continued group deliberation. The authors sketch a preliminary schedule of these groupdeliberative virtues modelled on Aristotle's conception of virtue as the mean between two extreme vices.The virtues discussed in this article include deliberative wit, friendliness, empathy, charity, temperance, courage, sincerity, and humility.In this paper, we will argue for two main claims and underscore one of their practical implications for the cultivation of democratic citizens. The first and weaker claim is that it is often better to deliberate in groups than to deliberate by oneself, because the epistemic results of group deliberation can, in certain cases, outshine the epistemic results of solitary deliberation ( §1). The second and more important claim for our purposes is that, while group deliberation may help move us toward achieving superior epistemic results, deliberating in groups is not by itself sufficient. We must additionally engage in and engender group deliberation that proceeds in the right sort of way -as we will suggest, with group-deliberative virtue ( §1 and §2). A practical implication of our two claims is that communities of truth-seekers -including communities of teachers and students, as well as democratic citizens more generally -need forums of group deliberation that cultivate these virtues. Thus, it makes sense for us to attend to the development and practice of these virtues both in ourselves and others. Ultimately, following Aristotle, we will sketch a preliminary schedule of these group-deliberative virtues ( §3), and, finally we will briefly explain what distinguishes them from strictly epistemic virtues ( §4).Among philosophers, at least, deliberative virtues do not always get the attention they deserve. Even if it is common nowadays to value democratic ideals and group deliberation, Descartes and Plato seem to heavily influence the way philosophy (at least) is taught. Reflecting a certain Cartesian heritage, philosophy courses often equip students far more for solitary inquiry than for group deliberation. And in line with Plato's preference for aristocracy over democracy, 1 students are often moulded more into would-be experts than into citizens ready for democratic public exchange. Socrates' dialogical form is often treated as ancillary to concerns about politics, knowledge, and metaphysics. Consequently, the preparation students ...

The Importance of Participatory Virtues in the Future of Environmental Education

“…In deliberative processes involving multiple social groups, participants must in any case be prepared to work amicably with those who are unfamiliar. To that extent non-native participants of the 2000 SOLEC conference seem to have lacked what Aikin and Clanton have called ''group-deliberative virtues,'' including deliberative friendliness and humility (Aikin and Clanton 2010). Without these virtues, deliberative processes can fail to be sufficiently inclusive even when some of the relevant stakeholders are present and involved.…”

Teaching Critical Thinking Virtues and Vices

“…There are quite a few taxonomies of critical thinking virtues available (such as Ennis 1996;Facione 1995;Aikin & Clanton 2010;Aberdein 2010Aberdein , 2016Hanscomb 2017). Virtues commonly featured include commitment to truth seeking, inquisitiveness (or intellectual curiosity), open mindedness and a willingness to listen to others, tolerance of uncertainty, meta-cognition, humility, perseverance, and 'group-deliberative virtues' (Aikin & Clanton, 2010) such as temperance, wit, friendliness and courage. Unsurprisingly these virtues and their corresponding vices are particularly relevant to what can be observed in Twelve Angry Men.…”

Citizens' Political Prudence as a Democratic Virtue

“…Deliberative theories of democracy are especially well suited to account for this dimension of democratic agency. According to these accounts, in a democracy citizens are called to exercise not only rationality but also adequate “deliberative virtues” (Aikin and Clanton ; Grönlund, Setäla, and Herne ; Talisse )—virtues that are essential to form judgments about what is just and in the interest of all, such as openness, reasonableness, concern for the common good, empathy, and charity.…”