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All too commonly scholars take a piecemeal approach toward the work of medieval intellectuals such as Albert the Great (d. 1280), with a view to understanding singly his contributions to the history of science, various philosophical approaches, or theology, as if his mind was somehow compartmentalized. Furthermore, in spite of great advances in studying the history of occult subjects, modern writers sometimes still lapse into writing about medieval astrology as a superstition. This study suggests that we should consider medieval intellectual thought holistically, as a product of a different rationality than that which is dominant today. In order to illustrate this approach, I examine astrological belief within Albert’s thought as rational and consider some of the theological reasons why Albert was fascinated with this topic.

Albert the Great (c.1200-1280) was so interested in astrology and the influence of the heavens upon terrestrial affairs that he discussed this important component of natural philosophy in almost everything he wrote, from his early De bono to his late and unfinished Summa theologiae. A poorly understood component of the reason why he was so fascinated with this subject is his understanding of human versus animalistic action. According to Albert it is only when people act in accord with a willed choice informed by an understanding of why the action is undertaken that an activity may properly be considered human and therefore good, making it very important to understand external affecting factors. In Albert's philosophy, the most powerful external influence affecting a person is that derived from the heavens-therefore understanding these forces is important if one wishes to act as a fully actualized human. Analysis of this component of Albert's philosophical system is essential if we are to understand the vast importance that he gave astrology, which in turn is the key to many elements of his broader philosophy.

Scholarly attempts to analyze the history of science sometime suffer from an imprecise use of terms. In order to understand accurately how science has developed and from where it draws its roots, researchers should be careful to recognize that epistemic regimes change over time and acceptable forms of knowledge production are contingent upon the hegemonic discourse informing the epistemic regime of any given period. In order to understand the importance of this point, I apply the techniques of historical epistemology to an analysis of the place of the study of astrology in the medieval and early modern periods alongside a discussion of the “language games” of these period as well as the role of the “archeology of knowledge” in uncovering meaning in our study of the past. In sum, I argue that the term “science” should never be used when studying approaches to knowledge formation prior to the seventeenth century.

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