No abstract

Contrary to many historical views, recent evidence suggest that species-level behavioral and brain asymmetries are evident in nonhuman species. Here, we briefly present evidence of behavioral, perceptual, cognitive, functional, and neuroanatomical asymmetries in nonhuman primates. In addition, we describe two historical accounts of the evolutionary origins of hemispheric specialization and present data from nonhuman primates that address these specific theories. Specifically, we first discuss the evidence of that genes play specific roles in determining left–right differences in anatomical and functional asymmetries in primates. We next consider and present data on the hypothesis that hemispheric specialization evolved as a by-product of increasing brain size relative to the size of the corpus callosum in different primate species. Lastly, we discuss some of the challenges in the study of hemispheric specialization in primates and offer some suggestions on how to advance the field.

Cognitive set can be both helpful and harmful in problem solving. A large set of similar problems may be solved mechanically by applying a single-solution method. However, efficiency might be sacrificed if a better solution exists and is overlooked. Despite half a century of research on cognitive set, there have been no attempts to investigate whether it occurs in nonhuman species. The current study utilized a nonverbal, computer task to compare cognitive set between 104 humans and 15 baboons (Papio papio). A substantial difference was found between humans' and baboons' abilities to break cognitive set. Consistent with previous studies, the majority of humans were highly impaired by set, yet baboons were almost completely unaffected. Analysis of the human data revealed that children (aged 7-10) were significantly better able to break set than adolescents (11-18) and adults (19-68). Both the evolutionary and developmental implications of these findings are discussed.

A fundamental characteristic of human language is multimodality. In other words, humans use multiple signaling channels concurrently when communicating with one another. For example, people frequently produce manual gestures while speaking, and the words a person perceives are impacted by visual information. For this study, we hypothesized that similar to the way that humans regularly couple their spoken utterances with gestures and facial expressions, chimpanzees regularly produce vocalizations in conjunction with other communicative signals. To test this hypothesis, data were collected from 101 captive chimpanzees living in mixed-sex social groupings of seven to twelve individuals. A total of 2,869 vocal events were collected. The data indicate that approximately 50% of the vocal events were produced in conjunction with another communicative modality. In addition, approximately 68% were directed to a specific individual, and these directed vocalizations were more likely to include a signal from another communicative modality than were vocalizations that were not directed to a specific individual. These results suggest that, like humans, chimpanzees often pair their vocalizations with signals from other communicative modalities. In addition, chimpanzees appear to use their communicative signals strategically to meet specific socio-communicative ends, providing support for the growing literature that indicates that at least some chimpanzee vocal signaling is intentional.

Among nonhuman primates, chimpanzees are well known for their sophistication and diversity of tool use in both captivity and the wild. The evolution of tool manufacture and use has been proposed as a driving mechanism for the development of increasing brain size, complex cognition and motor skills, as well as the population-level handedness observed in modern humans. Notwithstanding, our understanding of the neurological correlates of tool use in chimpanzees and other primates remains poorly understood. Here, we assessed the hand preference and performance skill of chimpanzees on a tool use task and correlated these data with measures of neuroanatomical asymmetries in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the pli-de-passage fronto-parietal moyen (PPFM). The IFG is the homolog to Broca’s area in the chimpanzee brain and the PPFM is a buried gyrus that connects the pre- and post-central gyri and corresponds to the motor-hand area of the precentral gyrus. We found that chimpanzees that performed the task better with their right compared to left hand showed greater leftward asymmetries in the IFG and PPFM. This association between hand performance and PPFM asymmetry was particularly robust for right-handed individuals. Based on these findings, we propose that the evolution of tool use was associated with increased left hemisphere specialization for motor skill. We further suggest that lateralization in motor planning, rather than hand preference per se, was selected for with increasing tool manufacture and use in Hominid evolution.

Through codified rule-use humans can accurately solve many problems. Yet, mechanized strategies can also be costly. After adopting a solution strategy, humans often become blind to alternatives, even when those alternatives are more efficient. Termed cognitive set, this failure to switch from a familiar strategy to a better alternative has been considered universally human.Yet, our understanding of this phenomenon is derived almost exclusively from Western subjects.In this study, we used the nonverbal Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy (LS-DS) touch screen task in which subjects are presented with an opportunity to either use a learned strategy or a more efficient, but novel, shortcut. We found that the remote, seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited enhanced shortcut-use on the LS-DS task, challenging the claim that cognitive set affects humans universally. Additionally, we found that altering subjects' conceptualization of the shortcut as a viable option significantly enhanced its subsequent use in Western but not Himba participants. We discuss how other aspects of cultural variation, namely environmental uncertainty and educational background, might contribute to the observed crosscultural differences in flexible strategy-use.

Several studies are reported which examine the critical stimuli and responses as well as personality factors important in genital exhibitionism. Using penile volume measurement, sex history questionnaires, personality tests, and behavioral observations, it was found that (1) exhibitionists responded most to mature females and were comparable to normals in reactions to children and men; (2) while exhibitionists indicated narcissistic desires in exposing, in a laboratory study they did not differ from controls in reactions to exposing with various reactions of the female, from sexual arousal and admiration to fear and anger; (3) the only strong features distinguishing exhibitionists from controls and other sexually anomalous subjects were peeping associated with orgasm and outdoor solitary masturbation; (4) exhibitionists seemed to be less assertive and less feminine than controls, but results were weak and inconsistent; (5) exhibitionists and controls did not differ in separation and divorce or marital satisfaction; (6) blood testosterone and penile reactivity of exhibitionists were within normal limits. Overall, the results suggest that most major theories of genital exhibitionism are wanting. It is suggested that narcissism and pedophilia be examined further in connection with exhibitionism.

Learned rules help us accurately solve many problems, but by blindly following a strategy, we sometimes fail to find more efficient alternatives. Previous research found that humans are more susceptible to this “cognitive set” bias than other primates in a nonverbal computer task. We modified the task to test one hypothesis for this difference, that working memory influences the advantage of taking a shortcut. During training, 60 humans, 7 rhesus macaques, and 22 capuchin monkeys learned to select three icons in sequence. They then completed 96 baseline trials, in which only this learned rule could be used, and 96 probe trials, in which they could also immediately select the final icon. Rhesus and capuchin monkeys took this shortcut significantly more often than humans. Humans used the shortcut more in this new, easier task than in previous work, but started using it significantly later than the monkeys. Some participants of each species also used an intermediate strategy; they began the learned rule but switched to the shortcut after selecting the first item in the sequence. We suggest that these species differences arise from differences in rule encoding and in the relative efficiency of exploiting a familiar strategy versus exploring alternatives.