As the amount of digital data grows, so does the theft of sensitive data through the loss or misplacement of laptops, thumb drives, external hard drives, and other electronic storage media. Sensitive data may also be leaked accidentally due to improper disposal or resale of storage media. To protect the secrecy of the entire data lifetime, we must have confidential ways to store and delete data. This survey summarizes and compares existing methods of providing confidential storage and deletion of data in personal computing environments.

The ability to securely delete sensitive data from electronic storage is becoming important. However, current per-file deletion solutions tend to be limited to a segment of the operating system's storage data path or specific to particular file systems or storage media.This paper introduces TrueErase, a holistic secure-deletion framework. Through its design, implementation, verification, and evaluation, TrueErase shows that it is possible to build a legacycompatible full-storage-data-path framework that performs perfile secure deletion and works with common file systems and solid-state storage, while handling common system failures. In addition, this framework can serve as a building block for encryption-and tainting-based secure-deletion systems.

This paper confronts the issue of bringing high performance computing (HPC) education to those who do not have access to a dedicated clustering environments in an easy, fully-functional, inexpensive manner through the use of the "Bootable Cluster CD" (BCCD

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Confidential data storage through encryption is becoming increasingly important.Designers and implementers of encryption methods of storage media must be aware that storage has different usage patterns and properties compared to securing other information media such as networks. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate two-time pad vulnerabilities in storage that are exposed via shifting file contents, in-place file updates, storage mechanisms hidden by layers of abstractions, inconsistencies between memory and disk content, and backups. We also demonstrate how a simple application of Bloom filters can automatically extract plaintexts from two-time pads. Further, our experience sheds light on system research directions to better support cryptographic assumptions and guarantees.

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