Human and nonhuman primates are not mentally constrained to the present. They can remember the past and – at least to an extent – anticipate the future. Anticipation of the future ranges from long-term prospection such as planning for retirement to more short-term future oriented cognition such as planning a route through a maze. Here we tested a great ape species (chimpanzees), an Old World monkey species (rhesus macaques) a New World monkey species (capuchin monkeys) and human children on a computerized maze task. All subjects had to move a cursor through a maze to reach a goal at the bottom of the screen. For best performance on the task, subjects had to “plan ahead” to the end of the maze to move the cursor in the correct direction, avoid traps, and reverse directions if necessary. Mazes varied in difficulty. Chimpanzees were better than both monkey species, and monkeys showed a particular deficit when moving away from the goal or changing directions was required. Children showed a similar pattern to monkeys regarding the effects of reversals and moves away from the goal, but their overall performance in terms of correct maze completion was similar to the chimpanzees. The results highlight similarities as well as differences in planning across species and the role that inhibitory control may play in future oriented cognition in primates.

Three chimpanzees performed a computerized memory task in which auditory feedback about the accuracy of each response was delayed. The delivery of food rewards for correct responses was also delayed and occurred in a separate location from the response. Crucially, if the chimpanzees did not move to the reward-delivery site before food was dispensed, the reward was lost and could not be recovered. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to move to the dispenser on trials they had completed correctly than on those they had completed incorrectly, and these movements occurred before any external feedback about the outcome of their responses. Thus, chimpanzees moved (or not) on the basis of their confidence in their responses, and these confidence movements aligned closely with objective task performance. These untrained, spontaneous confidence judgments demonstrated that chimpanzees monitored their own states of knowing and not knowing and adjusted their behavior accordingly.

Recent studies of delay of gratification in capuchin monkeys using a rotating tray (RT) task have shown improved self-control performance in these animals in comparison to the accumulation (AC) task. In this study, we investigated whether this improvement resulted from the difference in methods between the rotating tray task and previous tests, or whether it was the result of greater overall experience with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 1 produced similar performance levels by capuchins monkeys in the RT and AC tasks when identical reward and temporal parameters were used. Experiment 2 demonstrated a similar result using reward amounts that were more similar to previous AC experiments with these monkeys. In Experiment 3, monkeys performed multiple versions of the AC task with varied reward and temporal parameters. Their self-control behavior was found to be dependent on the overall delay to reward consumption, rather than the overall reward amount ultimately consumed. These findings indicate that these capuchin monkeys’ self-control capacities were more likely to have improved across studies because of the greater experience they had with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 tested new, task-naïve monkeys on both tasks, finding more limited evidence of self-control, and no evidence that one task was more beneficial than the other in promoting self-control. The results of this study suggest that future testing of this kind should focus on temporal parameters and reward magnitude parameters to establish accurate measures of delay of gratification capacity and development in this species and perhaps others.

We examined the controlling factors that allow a prompted skill to become autonomous in a discrete-trials implementation of Touchette's (1971) progressively delayed prompting procedure, but our subjects were rats rather than children with disabilities. Our prompted skill was a left-right lever-press sequence guided by two panel lights. We manipulated (a) the effectiveness of the guiding lights prompt and (b) the presence or absence of a progressively delayed prompt in four groups of rats. The less effective prompt yielded greater autonomy than the more effective prompt. The ability of the progressively delayed prompt procedure to produce behavioral autonomy depended upon characteristics of the obtained delay (trial duration) rather than on the pending prompt. Sequence accuracy was reliably higher in unprompted trials than in prompted trials, and this difference was maintained in the 2 groups that received no prompts but yielded equivalent trial durations. Overall sequence accuracy decreased systematically as trial duration increased. Shorter trials and their greater accuracy were correlated with higher overall reinforcement rates for faster responding. Waiting for delayed prompts (even if no actual prompt was provided) was associated with lower overall reinforcement rate by decreasing accuracy and by lengthening trials. These findings extend results from previous studies regarding the controlling factors in delayed prompting procedures applied to children with disabilities.

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