At RGV, AA 06:26n Kant famously (or infamously) claims that humanity and personality are not necessarily coextensional. This claim has been characterized in the secondary literature as Kant's worst mistake and as an unnecessary repudiation of his earlier (and more plausible) ethical thought. I argue that this characterization of RGV, AA 06:26n rests on a misinterpretation of the term 'humanity'. I try to show that Kant's claim at RGV, AA 06:26n not only is not problematic; it constitutes a powerful reminder of the kind of epistemic modesty that Kant argues for in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Categorical Imperative closer to intuition, Kant articulates the Formula of Humanity: FH Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. 3 7 containment condition, it passes the FH. But there are more actions that fail to treat humanity at the same time as an end (and, therefore, fail the end-containment condition) than use humanity merely as a means (and, therefore, fail the FH prohibition). So, if we are limiting ourselves to interpreting the FH prohibition (rather than the FH as 8 a whole), only the consent condition can be equivalent. However, there is debate about how the consent condition should be understood. As noted in the introduction, there are three main options: possible, actual, and rational consent. O'Neill and Korsgaard advocate possible consent. According to Korsgaard, 9The sense of "could not possibly" [consent]...is literal. The victims of forceful, coercive, and deceptive actions cannot consent because these actions by their nature give their victims no opportunity to consent. 10 There is a subtlety here that is sometimes overlooked. We can distinguish agent-centered from patientcentered accounts of consent. This distinction is frequently made in discussions of informed consent. An agent-11 centered account of informed consent asks whether the agent provides sufficient information to the patient. A patient-centered account asks whether the patient has sufficient information. These diverge if the patient has information that the agent did not provide or if the patient was distracted while the agent was providing information.This distinction is also useful for possible consent. An agent-centered account of possible consent focuses on the agent's maxim of action. A patient-centered account focuses on the condition of the patient. To see how these come apart, consider the following example from Kerstein: Suppose that I hail a cab and ask the driver to take me to the airport. But, unknown [sic] to me, the driver cannot refuse my request; he cannot avert my use of him. For he has been hypnotized into being unshakably convinced that he cannot turn down any request I make. 12 Kerstein thinks that this example poses a problem for the possible consent account because (a) it is not possible for the cab driver to refuse Kerstein's use of him, and (b) the cab driver is not being used merely as a means. But
Proponents of the utilitarian animal welfare argument (AWA) for veganism maintain that it is reasonable to expect that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. In this paper I argue otherwise. I maintain that (i) there are plausible scenarios in which refraining from meat-consumption will not decrease animal suffering; (ii) the utilitarian AWA rests on a false dilemma; and (iii) there are no reasonable grounds for the expectation that adopting a vegan diet will decrease animal suffering. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I set out the utilitarian AWA in its original form. I give some background and I distinguish it from other, related arguments. In the second, I discuss the causal impotence objection, a popular objection to the utilitarian AWA. I explain how the objection works by means of a conceptual distinction between consumers and producers. In the third, I explain how proponents of the utilitarian AWA respond to this objection. In particular, I set out in some detail what I call the expected utility response. In the fourth and final section, I use the three objections noted above to explain why I do not find this response convincing.
In this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have endorsed this principle.
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