This article discusses the increasing use of private military companies (PMCs) in United States’ security policy in Africa, and examines this phenomenon in relation to the US’ various military training programmes on the continent. We argue that the increasing use of PMCs in US security policy has evolved due to two critical and mutually dependent developments; African state weakness and resource stringency on the one hand, and the US's overwhelming security commitments around the world, combined with military downsizing, on the other. The article further argues that the involvement of PMCs is to a large extent informed by US concerns about access to African resources, especially oil, in the face of stiff competition from China. We conclude that the increasing US engagement in Africa is highly militaristic and state-centric, and that it is primarily conditioned by US strategic interests and does not necessarily reflect African security concerns: human security for development.
In this paper we argue that, since its birth, the African Union (AU) has established a set of norms and principles that mirror the tenets of R2P as agreed to by the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. Th ese norms and principles coupled with the AU's peace and security architecture make it proactive in confl ict prevention and the management of crisis situations on the continent. Collaborative ventures between the African Union (at the continental level), the regional economic communities (RECs) at the (sub-regional level) and the UN (at the global level), we argue, are thus the best options for deepening R2P norms. We argue that the world is experiencing a unique moment of opportunity in the relations between the UN and (sub) regional organisations broadly and the AU specifi cally. However, the AU's responses to current security challenges in Darfur in Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe, and especially the ICC's application for the issuance of arrest warrant for President Al Bashir of Sudan, does not refl ect a clear commitment to the responsibility to protect. Th e AU's attempt to solve the continent's problems will continue to be thwarted by its lack of political will and the weakening of its norms and principles by some Member States.
Since its first intervention in Liberia in December 1989, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has, in conjunction with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), managed to resolve intrastate violence in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire through its political and military interventions. One aspect of the work undertaken by the ECOWAS that has received little scholarly attention are the economic dimensions of the peace accords it has negotiated. To date, no scholarly work that we know of has focused on this aspect of ECOWAS peace initiatives. The same is true of other peace initiatives, such as those in Côte d'Ivoire, led by other actors. This paper seeks to bridge these scholarly lacunae by evaluating the economic dimensions of peace agreements in these three countries, and by examining how these agreements address the distribution and management of economic resources. We argue that because these conflicts were partially underpinned by the mismanagement of economic resources, the search for peace should necessarily include addressing economic issues at the negotiating table.
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