Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration and human capital (HC) disclosure released via LinkedIn. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a quantitative methodology. The sample is composed of 150 European companies. Content analysis was used to examine HC disclosure via LinkedIn. Regression analysis was used to test the hypothesis. Findings The results indicate that ownership concentration negatively influences HC disclosure via LinkedIn, confirming that closely held firms have little motivation to voluntarily release information. Research limitations/implications The main limitation of this study relates to the sample size. Furthermore, this study investigates only the quantity of HC disclosure; it does not consider the quality of this information. Practical implications The typical ownership structure of European firms generates a force that opposes the growing pressure for internationalization and global transparency. This important issue needs to be considered in investor decisions, HC management and reporting and in setting accounting standards. Moreover, the study points out that, despite the potential opportunities provided by LinkedIn to build and enforce relationships with their stakeholders, companies mainly use LinkedIn for recruitment purposes. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on HC disclosure because it is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first study that exclusively examines HC disclosure by European companies via LinkedIn and because it develops a disclosure index that includes items concerning the stock of knowledge and capabilities of employees in addition to the practices in human resource management.

Purpose\ud The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, including judicial system efficiency as a moderator to investigate the joint effects of both explanatory variables. Although prior studies have considered judicial system efficiency by examining de jure investor protection, this study identifies another useful proxy and explores de facto legal protection.\ud \ud Design/methodology/approach\ud Ordinary Least Square multiple regression models were used to examine the influence of judicial efficiency, which was measured using the Disposition Time (DT) and Legal Origin, as a moderator of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance for a sample of 565 non-financial companies listed in Italy, France, Germany and Spain in 2013.\ud \ud Findings\ud This paper shows that de facto investor protection ensured by an efficient judicial system is relevant to the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure. As a moderator variable, DT strengthens the intensity of this relationship in countries with low judicial efficiency, showing that ownership concentration leads to a better enhancement of firm performance and is therefore a more efficient governance mechanism in countries in which investor protection is weak.\ud \ud Originality/value\ud The evidence presented expands our understanding of the link between firm performance and ownership structure. The institutional deficiencies suggest that internal governance mechanisms may substitute for external mechanisms in facilitating efficient governance. This study corroborates policymakers’ concerns regarding the efficiency of judicial systems and their role in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. The results suggest a need for more efficient external mechanisms of investor protection to facilitate investment in equity capital. Moreover, this study shows that DT is a more accurate measure of investor protection than the traditional measure of de jure legal protection

In November 2006 the International Accounting Standards Board issued IFRS 8, which replaced IAS 14-Revised and became effective for the fiscal year beginning on or after 2009. IFRS 8 changed the items of information that companies have to disclose for each segment. The aim of the research is to examine the determinants of segment disclosures provided by Italian companies in both 2008 and 2009 using the framework of the proprietary costs theory. Moreover, the research investigates whether the implementation of IFRS 8 has brought companies operating in less competitive industries to adopt some opportunistic behaviors, reducing the level of segment disclosure provided in 2009, compared to that disclosed the previous year under IAS 14-R. The results show that higher levels of industry competition are associated with higher levels of segment disclosure. Moreover, we find that firms operating in less competitive industries decreased the items of information provided for each segment under IFRS 8, compared to those released the previous year.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to assess the degree of disclosure about compliance with corporate governance code and the explanations provided by Italian firms and second, to analyze the relationships between this disclosure and different variables of ownership structure. Design/methodology/approach The sample was composed of 75 non-financial companies listed in Italy in 2016. Content analysis of the corporate governance statement and ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression models were used to test the hypotheses. Findings Companies tended to comply with the corporate governance code and to disclose this information, but when they decided to not comply, they did not provide adequate explanations. Findings revealed a negative relation between ownership concentration and the disclosure analyzed. Results also highlight that a more equal distribution of shares among larger shareholders is beneficial for disclosure. Moreover, the presence of a dominant financial shareholder at a high level of ownership concentration creates inefficiency of the degree of adherence to the comply-or-explain principle. Originality/value This study examines in depth the underexplored issue of “explanation” and exceeds the issue of ownership concentration, which has already been examined extensively, raising the issues of counterweight power and shareholders’ identities, which remain underexplored. In this way, results presented contribute to explaining some causes of the diverse findings that research has found about the relationship between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure, demonstrating the importance of counterweight power and largest shareholder’s identity. Consequently, when self-regulating initiatives are designed and implemented, legislators, regulators and managers should not ignore the characteristics of the firms’ ownership structure.

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