Not all countries do their fair share in the effort of preventing dangerous climate change. This presents those who are willing to do their part with the question whether they should 'take up the slack' and try to compensate for the non-compliers' failure to reduce emissions. There is a pro tanto reason for doing so given the human rights violations associated with dangerous climate change. The article focuses on fending off two objections against a duty to take up the slack: that it is unfair and ineffective. We grant that it is unfair if some have to step in for others but argue that this does not amount to a decisive objection under conditions of partial compliance. With regard to the charge of emission reductions being ineffective, we argue that the empirical case for this claim is missing and that even if it were not, there still remains the option of taking up the slack in other forms. climate change. This presents those who are willing to do their part with the question whether they should`take up the slack' and try to compensate for the non-compliers' failure to reduce emissions. There is a pro tanto reason for doing so given the human rights violations associated with dangerous climate change. The article focuses on fending o two objections against a duty to take up the slack: that it is unfair and ineective. We grant that it is unfair if some have to step in for others but argue that this does not amount to a decisive objection under conditions of partial compliance. With regard to the charge of emission reductions being ineective, we argue that the empirical case for this claim is missing and that even if it were not, there still remains the option of taking up the slack in other forms.
Sollten Individuen angesichts des drohenden Klimawandels ihre persönlichen Treibhausgasemissionen einschränken? Ist es moralisch problematisch, ein unter ungerechten Arbeitsbedingungen produziertes Kleidungsstück zu kaufen? Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen hängt davon ab, inwiefern wir als Individuen für moralische Übel mitverantwortlich sind, die durch eine Vielzahl von Akteuren gemeinsam verursacht werden. Die Herausforderung für eine Begründung individueller Verantwortung besteht darin, dass Handlungen wie das Fahren eines Autos mit hohem Treibhausgasausstoß oder der Kauf eines unter ungerechten Bedingungen hergestellten Kleidungsstücks scheinbar keinen Ein uss auf die relevanten Übel haben: Ob ich als Individuum diese Handlungen ausführe oder nicht, ändert -so scheint es -nichts am kollektiven Ergebnis, und so entsteht der Eindruck, dass die Basis für die Zuschreibung moralischer Verantwortung fehlt. In diesem Buch wird gezeigt, dass Individuen zu kollektiv verursachten Übeln in einer Weise beitragen, die moralische Verantwortung begründet. Zudem wird diese auch dadurch nicht aufgehoben, dass andere Akteure nicht bereit sind, Beitragshandlungen zu Übeln zu unterlassen. For more information see brill.com Order information: Order online at brill.com The Americas: 1 (860) 350 0041 | brillna@turpin-distribution.com Outside the Americas: 44 (0) 1767 604-954 | brill@turpin-distribution.com
Recent philosophical work on children and childhood has revealed many new questions concerning minors’ rights. This special issue of Moral Philosophy and Politics offers new contributions to the topics of paternalism, the nature of the right to parent and children’s voting. It also contains articles about the so far less explored questions of adolescents’ parental rights, minors’ rights against the harms of parental imprisonment, and their right to veto their own parents’ decision to relocate.
Even though co‐parenthood is one of the most significant close personal relationships that people can have, there is relatively little philosophical work on the moral duties that co‐parents owe each other. This may be due to the increasingly questionable assumption, still common in our societies, that co‐parenthood arises naturally from marriage or romantic coupledom and thus that commitment to a co‐parent evolves from a commitment to a marital or romantic partner. In this article, we argue that co‐parenthood should be seen as a relationship in its own right, which generates specific moral duties. Co‐parents should come to explicit agreements with each other regarding the most important areas of potential conflict between them. Such agreements may have to be renegotiated over time. We explore some possible non‐negotiable co‐parental duties such as the duties not to alienate the child from the other parent(s) and not to trap a co‐parent in a particularly vulnerable situation. We consider some legal and societal implications of our argument and, finally, suggest some pragmatic benefits of our proposal.
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