Stepping in for the Polluters? Climate Justice under Partial Compliance

Abstract

Not all countries do their fair share in the effort of preventing dangerous climate change. This presents those who are willing to do their part with the question whether they should 'take up the slack' and try to compensate for the non-compliers' failure to reduce emissions. There is a pro tanto reason for doing so given the human rights violations associated with dangerous climate change. The article focuses on fending off two objections against a duty to take up the slack: that it is unfair and ineffective. We grant that it is unfair if some have to step in for others but argue that this does not amount to a decisive objection under conditions of partial compliance. With regard to the charge of emission reductions being ineffective, we argue that the empirical case for this claim is missing and that even if it were not, there still remains the option of taking up the slack in other forms. climate change. This presents those who are willing to do their part with the question whether they should`take up the slack' and try to compensate for the non-compliers' failure to reduce emissions. There is a pro tanto reason for doing so given the human rights violations associated with dangerous climate change. The article focuses on fending o two objections against a duty to take up the slack: that it is unfair and ineective. We grant that it is unfair if some have to step in for others but argue that this does not amount to a decisive objection under conditions of partial compliance. With regard to the charge of emission reductions being ineective, we argue that the empirical case for this claim is missing and that even if it were not, there still remains the option of taking up the slack in other forms.

Non-ideal climate justice

“…The partial compliance interpretation is probably the most common one among climate ethicists (see Caney 2005, 2016a, 2016b, Hohl and Roser 2011, Shue 2014, ch. 15, Roser and Seidel 2017.…”

“…Moreover, as the title gives away, it is centrally featured in the anthology Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World (2016) that Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser have edited. It has also been the topic of some journal articles: Hohl and Roser (2011), Maltais (2013Maltais ( , 2014, Caney (2005Caney ( , 2016a, Gajevic Sayegh (2016).…”

Carbon Sink Conservation and Global Justice: Benefitting, Free Riding and Non-compliance

“…However, this obviously raises the question of whether states such as Ecuador and Papua New Guinea do indeed have an obligation to take up the slack, considering that (a) other states are non-complying and (b) the only reason why we are in the current situation is other states' overconsumption (Hohl and Roser 2011). On top of that the states mentioned in sub-clause (a) and (b) are largely the same states (though not necessarily so), meaning that the ones responsible for the mess are also the ones who do not help to clean it up (or at least they do not help as much as they should).…”

Buying Low, Flying High: Carbon Offsets and Partial Compliance

“…A possible objection to my argument is given by Sabine Hohl and Dominic Roser (2011), who analyse the obligations of states to reduce GHG emissions in non-compliance situations. They claim that ‘it is not clear why we should take full compliance as the condition under which our responsibility or duty all things considered is to be determined’ and, if other states do not comply, ‘there is an unacceptably large potential of human rights violations' (Hohl and Roser, 2011, p. 481, emphasis in original). In their view, there is at least a pro tanto argument for taking up the slack of other states.…”