Contemporary philosophers interested in Fichte have more reason to rejoice. 1 In the last few years, a number of significant publications have appeared on J. G. Fichte, concerned primarily with his moral philosophy. Owen Ware's new book Fichte's Moral Philosophy is one of these. In this review, I shall say a few remarks about how Ware's book fits into the territory being mapped by Fichte scholars, and then ask some questions of the content of the book itself.The overriding theme of Ware's book is a welcome account of Fichte, presenting him as concerned with wholeness or unity. Humankind is originally one, but rational reflection makes us estranged from ourselves. Fichte, on Ware's account, laments this condition, and articulates a moral philosophy, derived from the foundational principles of philosophical science (Wissenschaftslehre) which incorporates this insight into the human condition and shows us how to make sense of it. As Ware puts it, Fichte's notion of an individual agent's ethical vocation is spelled out in terms of 'reuniting with our nature, which he views as a state of undivided wholeness' (p. 12). Naturally, Ware does not mean that Fichte should be read as arguing for a return to a romantic golden age, but rather as thinking that our drives, or dispositions, to self-love and morality can be rendered harmonious through life-long moral effort. In setting out Fichte's vision, Ware traces Fichte's thoughts from the origins, in the discovery that Kant showed the way forwardexposing Fichte's early dilemma, a mindless heart or heartless mind, as a false one (p. 6). He then guides the reader through a second chapter, a historically informed discussion on the nature of the free will, a third chapter on the nature and source of moral authority, a fourth on the theory of the drives, a fifth regarding the nature of conscience, especially paying attention to Fichte's strong claim that conscience never errs, a sixth chapter on Fichte's account of how evil is possible, a seventh focusing on the role of community in moral theory, and an eighth on perfection and the 1 Unless otherwise noted, page references are to Ware's book.

In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.

It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this article, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the relationship of faith and moral action.

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Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson’s Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson’s change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This authentically fascist view is then seen to fall prey into the problem inherent in the very idea of permanent rebirth.