Transcendental Idealism and Naturalism: The Case of Fichte

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.

Immanence in Schelling and Hegel in the Jena Period

“…It is not grounded by another truth or determined by another one; instead, on the contrary, every other truth is determined by this one. (Fichte 2016, 24)Trying to achieve the Highest Good depends on faith that the Highest Good shall be achieved; thus, “this faith is in the moral world‐order itself (the Provident Order)” (Phillips 2020, 56), and the “living and active moral order is itself God; we require no other God and can grasp no other” (Fichte 2016, 26). It follows—and this is consistent with what Fichte had already expressed in the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre —that the I (the finite self) must strive to change nature and the world to make them consistent with the telos , that is, the Highest Good.…”

“…that] the moral world order itself is God, and we require no other God .” It would be difficult to interpret this claim in any other way than as an affirmation of the coincidence of God with the moral world order. As explained by Bowman (2002, 291), “Fichte does not claim that God is the creator of the moral world‐order that brings about the final end of morality”; rather, he claims that “God is the moral world‐order, that God cannot be conceived apart from the moral world‐order.” However, Fichte importantly adds that the moral world order implies “nothing but an active ordering (ordo ordinans) ” (Fichte 1994, 161); this means that—as explained by Phillips (2020, 57)—“it is not fixed in advance, and finite agents can make a difference by acting morally . .…”