Using a sample of Swedish households, we estimate a household labor supply model assuming that preferences for consumption and leisure can be described by a direct translog utility function. The labor supply and welfare participation decisions are treated as a discrete choice problem, and we assume that these choices follow a simple conditional logit rule. In addition, we allow unobserved individual-specific effects to be correlated across alternatives. We assume that these unobserved effects are drawn from a discrete distribution, and the correlation across alternatives is modeled using factor-loading techniques. Classification error in hours is allowed for by using a multiplicative measurement error specification. The estimates from the structural model yield inelastic labor supply among husbands and positive wage elasticity for wives. Further, the cross elasticities are close to zero.

In this paper we evaluate a hypothetical tax and benefit reform to increase the working hours and to decrease welfare participation of single mothers in Sweden. We formulate and estimate simultaneously a structural static model of labor supply and welfare participation. The results suggest that labor supply among single mother households in Sweden is quite elastic, and that there is self-selection into welfare. We also find that the proposed reform would generate welfare gains for virtually everyone in the sample, benefit low-income households, and would at the same time generate a small revenue surplus. Copyright 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation 2007 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

The effects of a recent Swedish child-care fee reform are compared with those of an alternative reform, increased child benefits. The fee reform implied considerably decreased fees and was intended to increase both labor supply among parents and their economic well-being. We estimate labor supply effects using a discrete choice labor supply model, and simulate behavioral responses to the changes. We find positive, but small, effects on labor supply from reduced fees, while increased child benefits would make single mothers decrease their labor supply. On the other hand, increased child benefits would make income distribution more equal. We make a social welfare comparison and conclude that for plausible values of inequality aversion, the alternative reform would have been preferred to the implemented fee reform. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Labor supply, Redistribution, Reform, Child care, Fees, Child benefit, H31, I38, J22,

Poverty persistence, Duration dependence, Multiple spells, Unobserved heterogeneity, Natives, Immigrants, C23, C41, D31, I32, J15, J61,