Many studies report empirical relationship either between fertility and labour supply or, between health and labour market outcomes. In this paper, an extension of these ideas involves explicitly considering how fertility and health affect each other, and how they interrelate with labour force participation. A unifying framework is provided and a simultaneous three equations model developed to capture the interdependence between these variables as well as their respective determinants. The model is estimated using a cross-section data set obtained from a survey of the urban Cameroon population. The results indicate that: (i) fertility and health status are significantly interrelated, thus separate estimations of fertility (or health status) and participation will produce misleading results; (ii) working in either sector of the labour market significantly reduces fertility but, unlike many previous studies, fertility has a positive impact on the probability of labour force participation; (iii) there is strong evidence that health and disability status is a significant determinant of employment, but the reverse depend on the labour market sector and on the health indicator used.

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This paper evaluates and analyzes the effects of labor contracts on shirking in Cameroonian firms. This study uses the survey data collected in 2006 in Cameroonian manufacturing firms having more than 15 employees. Data processing produced a sample of 65 companies and 1809 employees. In addition to permanent or temporary distinctions, we considered the verbal aspect of labor contracts, affiliation to social security and promotion within the labor market. Econometric estimations take into account the endogeneity of the contractual trajectory of employees. Results are estimated in 2 stages. First, we evaluate the determinants of contract choice and the second; we estimate the degree in Cameroonian firms. This degree is measured by the level of effort deployed by workers. Results show that permanent employees after a verbal contract work harder than those who are permanent since their recruitment. In addition, the employees under short term contracts since their recruitment are more inclined to shirk as well as those who are permanent since their recruitment. Employees without social security are likely to cheat than those with social security and recruited permanently since the beginning.