Based on data from 7,350 Cameroonian companies created between 1990 and 2008, we study the link between the characteristics of indebtedness for young companies during their creation and survival period of up to three years, from three to five years, and beyond five years. We complement our quantitative analysis with semi-directive interviews of Cameroonian entrepreneurs to deepen our study. Our results are manifold. We show that access to bank loans during the creation phase, as well as the volume of loans or, to some extent, the debt ratio improve the probability of survival during the early years, but this effect fades away rapidly. The interviews shed light on the motivations of entrepreneurs, particularly of those with very small businesses. Finally, our work reveals the antecedent role of their social capital that facilitates their access to bank loans, and, therefore, the probability of company survival.

The main challenge of microfinance institutions and social economy firms remains their survival, and to meet this challenge, MFIs need to be competitive. The poor performance of MFIs is usually attributed to their decision-making and operational processes. The governance of MFIs is therefore identified as one of their main risks. Despite this, governance is still little explored in these organizations and empirical studies find a weak relationship between classical governance mechanisms and MFI performance, especially for the MFIs situated in Africa (Thrikawala et al., 2013a). In this study, we examine whether the effect of governance mechanisms on the performance of MFIs differs according to their legal status in the Cameroonian context. On the one hand, our empirical results show that there is a significant relationship between some specific governance mechanisms and MFIs' performance. On the other hand, adjusting the governance mechanisms according to the MFIs' legal status improves their efficiency. The analysis of the impact of the governance mechanisms on the performance of MFIs requires not only an approach that is specific to this sector but also an approach that is adapted to their legal status. Moreover, from a managerial point of view, it would be desirable to adjust the governance mechanisms, depending on the legal status of the MFIs, to make them more efficient from the social as well as the financial standpoint.

The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between a company's environmental performance and its systematic risk. Using a sample of 351 European listed companies over the 2007–2015 period, the technique of principal components analysis is applied to calculate a synthetic global index of corporate environmental performance using 71 evaluation criteria suggested by the ASSET4 database. Using this same approach, subindices of the global index are calculated using the following ASSET4 dimensions: reduction of emissions, product innovation, and reduction of resource usage. To test the relationship between these variables and risk, panel data regression techniques are applied. Results indicate that the synthetic global index of environmental performance negatively affects the systematic risk of company. The decomposition of this global index into three subindices shows that those subindices relating to the reduction of environmental emissions and of resource usage make it possible to significantly reduce systematic risk, whereas the subindex relating to product innovation has a rather moderate effect. Thus, environmental performance, like governance, can be considered as an insurance mechanism for the company, which reduces the probability of events occurring, which negatively affect its cash flow and risks faced by shareholders.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the mechanisms of corporate governance on the volatility of companies’ financial profitability. Design/methodology/approach For the period 2002-2014, the authors evaluate the relations linking various indices involved in corporate governance with the systematic risk supported by these companies for a sample of 355 firms domiciled in Europe. To empirically test these relationships, the authors calculated a synthetic index of corporate governance quality (QGI) based on the 53 items of assessment of the companies’ governance proposed by the database ASSET4. Following the method used by Boncori et al. (2016), the authors first reduced the number of dimensions of corporate governance by performing a principal component analysis of the sample, which resulted in the following five components: management’s shareholder commitment, shareholder rights, characteristics of the board of directors, transparency of the financial information and independence of the audit. Findings The results of the tests indicate that the synthetic index of governance that the authors have built is only significant at the 10 percent threshold. The impact of this variable on the systematic risk of the company is of the order of one-tenth of a point. The decomposition of this index into five variables shows that management’s commitment to shareholders and the effectiveness of the board of directors in carrying out its supervisory tasks are likely to reduce, but again to a limited extent, the risk borne by the company. Research limitations/implications This observation guides the future work in introducing variables that reflect the social responsibilities of the companies in the sample in order to distinguish the effects of social responsibility from those of purely shareholder-oriented governance on systematic risk. Practical implications This paper demonstrates the interest of good governance on the risk of firms and identifies certain characteristics upon which to act. Originality/value Although the relations between corporate governance mechanisms and profitability expectations have been the subject of numerous studies, few authors have examined the influence of governorship on the volatility of this profitability, particularly in Europe. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the rare work on this topic relates to only a limited number of countries.

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This study seeks to identify the factors that can simultaneously improve the environmental and financial performance of a company and determine if an improvement in the environmental performance of a company is accompanied by an improvement in its financial performance. We estimate a system of structural equations using the partial least squares approach applied to data on 351 large European-registered companies extracted from the ASSET4-Environmental, Social, and Governance database for the 2007–2015 period. The results show that the engagement of a company in environmental protection is significantly affected by the system of governance of the company and the availability of financial resources at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively. The results also show that engaging in environmental protection increases the accounting and stock exchange performance of companies. These results thus suggest that the protection of the ecosystem by companies leads to a paradigm, which can form the basis of a model of responsible governance whose goal is to create value while respecting environmental factors.

Cet article vise un double objectif : vérifier d’une part l’existence d’une relation entre l’investissement direct étranger (IDE) et la performance des entreprises bénéficiaires au Cameroun et d’autre part, s’assurer que le différentiel de performance entre les grandes entreprises au Cameroun trouve une explication dans l’ouverture ou non de leur capital social aux investisseurs étrangers. Sur le plan méthodologique, la vérification des hypothèses émises est sous-tendue par la mise en œuvre des analyses de la Covariance (MANCOVA) sur un échantillon de 362 grandes entreprises camerounaises référencées par l’Institut National de la Statistique du Cameroun en 2011. Les résultats obtenus montrent non seulement que l’investissement direct étranger a une influence positive et significative sur la performance des entreprises bénéficiaires, mais que les entreprises dont le capital est détenu partiellement ou totalement par les investisseurs étrangers sont plus performantes que celles au capital entièrement détenu par les nationaux. Classification JEL : C81, F21, F23, G34, L25

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