The failures of the Australian welfare state are often implicitly argued to derive in large part from the conservatism of the Australian public. This research uses public opinion poll data from 1940 to 1985 to question some of the claims made about public opinion and Australian welfare. These data indicate that postWorld War Two governments were not the captives of public opposition to expanded welfare provision. The public favoured generous, universal and contributory welfare provision in specific areas where the policies of successive Australian governments favoured selective, illiberal welfare measures funded by taxation. Moreover, public support for government health schemes suggests that welfare programmes generate public support ratherthan result from it.This evidence suggests that explanations for the conservatism of the Australian welfare state lie elsewhere.
Despite statutory reforms and potentially large economic gains from water trades, water markets have been slow to develop throughout the West. This article examines an institutional impediment that has not received adequate attention: How can irrigation districts structure water trades to benefit their customers? I t shows how this question can be satisfactorily answered by organizing a proposed water trade like a friendly corporate tender offer. While seemingly a radical procedure, the method conforms with a simple economic interpretation of statute and case law that ( I ) describes the trustee relationship between irrigation district boards and their customers and (2) defines the equitable and beneficial interest of landowners in the district's water supply.
Decontrol of the wellhead price of natural gas under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ended the general shortage of natural gas, which had begun in the 1960s. It also led to dislocations in gas markets because of regulatory uncertainties that created difficulties in renegotiating contracts made during the shortage period. Together, the decontrol and dislocations led to a decline in the traditional role of interstate gas pipelines as full-requirements suppliers to local distributors, who now use pipelines primarily as transporters of gas purchased independently of the pipelines. The growth in transport transactions has increased greatly the potential scope of efficient exchanges in gas markets. Achieving efficiency gains, however, requires an underlying right of access to pipelines that is non-discriminatory, exchangeable, and consistent with both existing regulation and pre-existing contractual relationships. The authors define such a right, which they call exchangeable transport entitlement (ETE). They show that ETE satisfies the criteria for efficiency gains, and they examine the practical problems of the transition that a regulatory regime incorporating ETE faces. The analysis has important implications for other industries and for the economic theory of regulation. Specifically, the analysis shows that economists must realize the importance of diverse contractual relationships in both their theoretical literature and their proposals for regulatory reform. Copyright 1990 Western Economic Association International.
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